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Note
UNITED, WE FALL: EXPELLING AUTOCRATIC
STATES FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
ZACHARY SANFILIPPO†
ABSTRACT
Since 2010, the Fidesz party has systemically and blatantly
undermined Hungary’s democratic institutions. Led by the autocrat
Orbán, Fidesz has rigged Hungary’s elections, packed its courts, and
violated its citizens’ human rights. So far, it has done so without any
real consequence from the European Union. This state cannot stand.
The inefficacy of the EU’s current attempts to discipline Hungary
suggests that a stronger remedy is necessary: expulsion. This Note
argues that allowing expulsion of materially breaching Member States
has not been foreclosed by CJEU jurisprudence and, indeed, advances
the EU Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer union.” Should Member States
retain their sovereign expulsion right, Article 60 VCLT operates as its
guiding law. Using this framework, Hungary’s recent autocratic actions
have violated the values of democracy, rule of law, and human rights
contained in Article 2 TEU, which is an essential provision of “ever
closer union.” As such, Hungary has likely materially breached its
treaty obligations, and so is liable for expulsion. Whether there is the
political will to achieve the required unanimity to effect expulsion
remains unclear. What is clear is that keeping autocracies in the Union
risks the legitimacy and long-term survival of the EU project.

INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
decided it was time. After four hard years of gerrymandering the
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electorate, rewriting the constitution, capturing the courts, and
silencing the media, it was time—finally—for Hungary’s autocratic
coming out.1 In a speech, Orbán declared: “[The] Hungarian nation is
not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be
organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state
that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state.”2
By 2014, Orbán and his political party, Fidesz, had largely
consolidated their control over Hungary. Orbán and Fidesz hijacked
the emerging democracy, “carr[ying] out an autocratic revolution with
exquisite legal precision.”3 Along with institutional capture, Fidesz has
used demagoguery to stay in power, inflaming public sentiment with
attacks on immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and LGBTQ+ individuals.4 But
Fidesz’s goal was more ambitious than simply undermining democracy;
the party seemingly aspired to entrench autocracy, permanently.5 And
all indicators suggest Fidesz has largely succeeded. Hungary’s
Democracy Score from Freedom House6 declined from 58/100 in 2017
to 45/100 in 2021,7 the “biggest decline ever measured in [Freedom

1. See infra Part III.B.
2. Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the XXV Bálványos Free Summer
University and Youth Camp (July 26, 2014) (emphasis added).
3. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 550 (2018) [hereinafter
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism].
4. See Zack Beauchamp, How Hatred of Gay People Became a Key Plank in Hungary’s
Authoritarian Turn, VOX (June 28, 2021, 10:40 AM) [hereinafter Beauchamp, How Hatred of Gay
People], https://www.vox.com/22547228/hungary-Orbán-lgbt-law-pedophilia-authoritarian [https
://perma.cc/L7SF-NL6T] (describing Orbán’s strategy of demonizing “Muslim migrants, Jewish
billionaire George Soros, and now LGBTQ activists . . . to rally [his] base”).
5. See Orbán, supra note 2 (observing that to be internationally competitive, Hungary might
have to embrace political “systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies,
maybe not even democracies . . . [like] Singapore, China, India, Turkey, Russia”); see also infra
Part III.B (outlining how Orbán and Fidesz have broken their obligations to the EU and
entrenched autocratic rule in Hungary by rigging elections, undermining the rule of law, and
violating human rights).
6. Freedom House is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that researches and reports on
“issues related to democracy, political rights and civil liberties” around the world. About Us,
FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/7A8R-8MGX]. Since
1941, it has operated “as an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of
freedom and democracy.” Id.
7. Daniel Hegedüs, Nations in Transit 2017: Hungary, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedom
house.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2017 [https://perma.cc/9KFY-JC4J]; Zsuzsanna Végh,
Nations in Transit 2021: Hungary, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/
nations-transit/2021 [https://perma.cc/UBD5-PUJ2]. For comparison, Hungary ranks slightly
lower on its Democracy Score than countries like Albania (46), Serbia (46), Montenegro (47),
and North Macedonia (47); but slightly higher than Kosovo (38), Moldova (35), and Ukraine (39).
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House’s] Nations in Transit.”8 On Sunday, April 3, 2022, Orbán and
Fidesz won 83 percent of Hungary’s electoral districts—with only 53
percent of the vote, a testament to how unshakeable Fidesz’s power
has become.9
Despite this explicit descent into autocracy, the European Union
(“EU”) (of which Hungary is a Member State) was sluggish in its
approach to the emergence of an autocratic regime in its midst. The
EU Commission leveled infringement proceedings10 against Hungary
in response to individual infringements of EU law, but only
sporadically and to limited effect.11 Recently, the Commission has also
begun to experiment by withholding EU funds to backsliding states
like Hungary, although this mechanism is dependent on “precise
case[]” outcomes and is slow-moving.12 The most powerful tool in the
EU governance structure to discipline breaching Member States—

It is substantially lower than consolidated democracies like Slovenia (79), Lithuania (77), and
Estonia (83). Countries and Territories, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/countries/
nations-transit/scores [https://perma.cc/SN7G-WAPQ].
8. ZSELYKE CSAKY, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC TURN 2 (Elisha
Aaron, David Meijer, Shannon O’Toole & Tyler Roylance eds., 2021), https://freedomhouse.org/
sites/default/files/2021-04/NIT_2021_final_042321.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8Z8-SBTL].
9. Kim Lane Scheppele, In Hungary, Orban Wins Again – Because He Has Rigged the
System, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2022, 9:53 PM) [hereafter Scheppele, In Hungary, Orban Wins
Again], https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/06/orban-fidesz-autocratic-hungary-illi
beral-democracy [https://perma.cc/XV5M-DSX2]. The thirty-point disparity between Fidesz’s
votes received and districts won in the 2022 parliamentary elections was the result of heavy
gerrymandering, electorate manipulation, blurred government-party messaging, and popularity
from the Ukrainian-Russian war. Id.
10. Per Articles 258 and 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”), the Commission may launch an infringement proceeding against a Member State that
“fail[s] to fulfill an obligation” under EU law. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union arts. 258–59, July 6, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47 [hereinafter
TFEU]. The Commission will first submit a request for information to an investigated country,
followed by an opinion if it is determined that the Member State is failing its legal obligations
under the EU Treaties. Infringement Procedure, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/
law-making-process/applying-eu-law/infringement-procedure_en [https://perma.cc/VBJ5-VF3Z].
If the violating Member State refuses to comply with the Commission’s opinion, the Commission
may refer the matter to the Court of Justice for the European Union (“CJEU”), which may
impose financial penalties on the non-complying Member State. Id.
11. See infra notes 127–128, 193–198 and accompanying text.
12. See Edit Inotai, EU Triggers Mechanism To Strip Hungary of Billions Worth of Budget
Funds, BALKAN INSIGHT (Apr. 5, 2022, 6:37 PM), https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/05/eutriggers-mechanism-to-strip-hungary-of-billions-worth-of-budget-funds [https://perma.cc/G44MNFA5] (noting that “any suspension of funds – if decided – could not happen before the end of
the year” and only if the EU Commission is successful in proving “precise cases where rule-oflaw deficiencies directly led to EU budget funds being misused in Hungary”).
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Article 7—has been largely kept sheathed. Dubbed the EU’s “nuclear
option,” Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”)
allows Member States to suspend a breaching Member’s voting rights
in EU institutions.13 The closest the mechanism ever came to being
used occurred on September 12, 2018, when the EU Parliament passed
a proposal asking for the Council of the EU to “determine . . . whether
Hungary is at risk of breaching the EU’s founding values.”14 The
proposal passed and was sent to the heads of the EU’s twenty-eight
member states, where it has so far failed to receive the four-fifths
approval necessary to advance it to the next stage.15 Even if the
proposal did pass that high hurdle, Hungary is unlikely to be
meaningfully sanctioned because Article 7 TEU sanctions can only be
applied with unanimity and Poland, another emerging autocracy, has
signaled its willingness to defend Hungary.16
Even so, the EU’s inability to substantively discipline Hungary
through infringement proceedings or Article 7 TEU does not doom it
to inaction. Theoretically, there remains one last tool at Member
States’ disposal: expulsion. Although the EU Treaties do not expressly
provide for expulsion, Member States retain a right of treaty
13. Ginger Hervey & Emmet Livingstone, What Is Article 7?, POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2016, 10:55
AM), https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-eu-news-article-7-vote-poland-rule-of-law [https://
perma.cc/U6UJ-JPDK].
14. European Parliament Press Release 20180906IPR12104, Rule of Law in Hungary:
Parliament Calls on the EU To Act (Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Parliament Press Release].
15. Rule of Law in Hungary and Poland: Plenary Debate and Resolution, NEWSLETTER 2–5
MAY 2022 STRASBOURG PLENARY SESSION (Eur. Parliament), Apr. 28, 2022, at 13, https://www
.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2022/4/briefing/20220425BRI27804/
20220425BRI27804_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2CT-HLCY]. Utilizing Article 7 TEU occurs in a
two-stage process. First, a proposal to trigger Article 7 proceedings can be brought by the
European Parliament, the Commission, or one-third of all Member States. The proposal must
then be adopted by the European Council by a vote of four-fifths. Second, if the proposal is
adopted by the Council, the Council may give a formal warning and recommendations to the
censured Member State. Member States may then, upon unanimous consent, implement
sanctions or suspend certain rights of the Member State. David Martin, What Is Article 7 of the
EU Treaty?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-article-7-of-theeu-treaty/a-41876855 [https://perma.cc/DM9N-TG5X].
16. See Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding
in the EU, 19 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 3, 28 (2017) (noting the European
Commission’s lack of foresight that “the presence of two illiberal countries in the EU would
annihilate the dissuasive nature of the sanctioning arm of Article 7(2–3) TEU”); Soraya Sarhaddi
Nelson, How Poland and Hungary Are Forming a Powerful Tag Team Against Brussels, NPR
(Mar. 12, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/12/587949473/howpoland-and-hungary-are-forming-a-powerful-tag-team-against-brussels [https://perma.cc/2R3Y7G5R] (describing the evident power of the alliance between Hungary and Poland).
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termination (i.e., de facto expulsion) under customary international
law (“CIL”).17
Allowing Member States to expel other (breaching) Member
States would advance the purpose of the EU Treaties.18 The Court of
Justice for the European Union (“CJEU”) has extensively declared
that that primary purpose of the EU Treaties is to create “an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe.”19 This purpose is best served by
affirming Member States’ CIL right to expel materially breaching
treaty partners. By interpreting “ever closer union” through the lens of
Article 2 TEU’s values of democracy, rule of law, and respect for
human rights,20 the Court would better ensure long-term EU unity by
allowing for the expulsion of states violating those values.
This Note argues that the EU’s purpose of “ever closer union” is
best served by allowing Member States to expel other materially
breaching Member States, pursuant to CIL as codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“VCLT”).21 Assuming
expulsion is consistent with the EU Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer

17. Customary international law, a.k.a. “custom” or “CIL,” is a set of rules that forms part
of international law. Hester Swift, Researching Customary International Law, 19 LEGAL INFO.
MGMT. 169, 169 (2019). Unlike other forms of international law like treaties or soft law, CIL is
often unwritten. Id. at 170. Traditionally, a rule of CIL only emerges when two elements are met:
states must engage in widespread and consistent action (the ‘state practice’ element) and states
must view that action as arising from a legal obligation (the ‘opinio juris’ element). Id. at 169–70.
Also, unlike treaties, to which a state must affirmatively agree to be bound, CIL is binding on all
states regardless of affirmative consent. HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 63 (2d ed. 2019). The theory is that a state is considered to have tacitly assented to the
establishment of a binding rule of CIL, unless it persistently objects to the establishment of the
CIL rule (at which point, the state is not considered bound to the emerging CIL rule, even if it
binding on other states). Id.
18. See infra Part II.
19. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 1, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU] (emphasis added).
20. See id. at art. 2 (“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights
of persons belonging to minorities.”).
21. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT]. Sometimes known as the “treaty on treaties,” the VCLT was drafted by the
International Law Commission (“ILC”) of the United Nations to help in the interpretation of
treaties and to codify CIL. ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES 6 (Francisco J. Laporta, Aleksander Peczenik & Frederick Schauer eds., 2007).
After a year and two sessions of work, the ILC published a final draft in 1969 to be signed by
interested states. Id. After receiving enough signatories, it entered into force on January 27, 1980.
Id.
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union,” this Note advances a theoretical legal framework by which
Member States could expel materially breaching states from the EU
via treaty termination. Using this framework, it is clear that Hungary,
by its descent into autocratic governance, has materially breached its
obligations under Article 1 TEU, and that the nonbreaching Member
States, if unanimous, can terminate the EU Treaties in relation to it.
Part I discusses the CJEU’s approach to the purpose of the EU
Treaties in its Wightman case and why allowing expulsion in the EU
Treaties better supports “ever closer union” among EU Member
States. Part II outlines the requirements for CIL treaty termination as
codified by Article 60 VCLT. Part III applies these requirements to
Hungary. Finally, Part IV analyzes the benefits and consequences
expulsion would provide to EU Member States.
I. EXPULSION BETTER SERVES “EVER CLOSER UNION”
CJEU jurisprudence might suggest that the Court would view a
retained right of treaty termination (which will, going forward, be
shorthanded as expulsion) as incompatible with the EU Treaties’
purpose of “ever closer union.” However, a closer analysis of the
Court’s most recent, leading case on the subject, Wightman v. Secretary
of State for Exiting the European Union,22 offers some hope that
expulsion has not been entirely foreclosed as a remedy. Indeed,
construing the EU Treaties to allow for expulsion of autocratic
Member States better ensures long-term EU unity and, therefore,
better serves the EU Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer union.” An
approach that does not allow expulsion would encourage the continued
violation of the EU’s foundational values and wrongly prioritize shortterm unity, ultimately endangering the long-term survival of the EU
project.
A. The CJEU’s Wightman Decision Should Be Read To Allow
Expulsion
Skeptics of the idea that Member States retain a right of expulsion
will point to the CJEU’s recent decision in Wightman as having
prohibited expulsion because of its incompatibility with the EU

22. Case C-621/18, Wightman v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the Eur. Union,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999 (Dec. 10, 2018).
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Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer union.”23 This reading of Wightman is
far too expansive. The Court’s decision, at most, can be read to
preclude “forced withdrawals” because of their incompatibility with
“ever closer union,” but it cannot, and should not, be read to have
reached the same conclusion for expulsion of Member States.24
It must be initially acknowledged that the EU Treaties have no
express expulsion provision.25 This means that any expulsion right, if it
exists at all, must exist by retention. Put another way, if nothing in the
Treaties, including their underlying purpose of “ever closer union,”
precludes the right of expulsion of materially breaching treaty partners,
the Member States retain it. This derives from the notion that states
may contract around their traditionally sovereign CIL rights by
entering treaties that expressly preclude those rights, and if they have
not expressly precluded those rights, then states retain them.26 Whether
there is such a retained right of expulsion by EU and European
Monetary Union (“EMU”) Member States has divided
commentators.27
23. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Could Greece Get Kicked Out of the European Union?,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:35 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/23/could-greece-getkicked-out-of-the-european-union [https://perma.cc/LMJ9-4H34] (“EU bylaws provide no mechanism
for expelling a member state. Indeed, the EU’s laws in spirit are integrative and unifying,
‘conciliatory’ rather than ‘punitive.’ Therefore, in letter, they provide no option for kicking a
country out, no matter how much other member countries might want to.”).
24. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
25. Boyko Blagoev, Expulsion of a Member State from the EU After Lisbon: Political Threat
or Legal Reality?, 16 TILBURG L. REV. 191, 195 (2011).
26. THIRLWAY, supra note 17, at 153 (observing that “a rule, or an obligation, derived from
a specific treaty excludes, as between the parties to that treaty, the operation of any inconsistent
customary rule that would otherwise govern the matter” and that, indeed, the whole notion of jus
cogens, which “cannot be contracted out of by treaty, is built on the assumption that all other
obligations of customary law can be so ousted”). Thirlway outlines that even if different sources
of international law operate on states simultaneously, these different sources
“operate . . . independently of each other.” Id. at 147. As such, just because a state enters into a
treaty silent on a particular CIL obligation, does not mean that obligation vanishes into the ether:
“The background of customary law is relevant to any question on which the treaty does not speak,
and may well be of service in the interpretation of the treaty . . . the customary rule remains
invisible, but alive and present.” Id. at 159.
27. Compare Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU:
Some Reflections 35 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Legal Working Paper No. 10, 2009), https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2KB-FQYM] (“[N]ot only
is a collective right of expulsion not provided for in the text of the treaties, but . . . the legitimacy
of its assertion or introduction would be highly questionable, both legally and conceptually.”),
and Lowrey, supra note 23 (noting that Europe cannot kick Greece out of the EU as “EU bylaws
provide no mechanism for expelling a member state”), and Melissa Gutierrez, Flying Too Close
to the Sun: How an EMU Expulsion Provision Will Prevent the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

SANFILIPPO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2022 1:45 PM

682

[Vol. 72:675

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

The CJEU utilizes a teleological, or purpose-driven, approach in
its jurisprudence. Teleological jurisprudence is a form of legal
reasoning “which seeks to interpret a rule by taking into account the
purpose, aim and objective it pursues.”28 CJEU caselaw is replete with
this method of reasoning,29 and the Court has concluded that “every
provision of Community law must be placed in its context and
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a
whole.”30 Using this reasoning, the CJEU consistently has found that
the EU Treaties’ purpose is reflected in Article 1 TEU, which declares:
“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer

from Becoming a Modern Day Greek Tragedy, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 431, 449 (2013) (“[A] Member
State cannot be forced out of the union against its will.”), and Steve Peers, Is a Temporary Grexit
Legally Possible? EMU as the Hotel California, EU L. ANALYSIS (July 11, 2015, 2:48 PM), http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/07/is-temporary-grexit-legally-possible.html [https://perma.cc/
P4Q4-9MHT] (“A Member State can leave EMU by leaving the EU, but there’s no Treaty power
to throw a Member State out of the EU, or to suggest that any Member State might ever be under
the obligation to leave.”), with Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Laurence R. Helfer, Can Greece
Be Expelled from the Eurozone? Toward a Default Rule on Expulsion from International
Organizations, in FILLING THE GAPS IN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EUROPE 127, 129 (Franklin
Allen, Elena Carletti, Joanna Gray & G. Mitu Gulati eds., 2016) (“[W]hile a general presumption
against expulsion may be sensible as a matter of law and policy, it is a mistake—legally and
otherwise—to conclude that the default rule for IOs and treaties should be a flat prohibition on
expulsion.”), and Blagoev, supra note 25, at 237 (arguing that “only an explicit prohibition on
expulsion would preclude the right of exit and close all the possible loopholes in European and
international law that may have the equivalent effect”).
28. Oreste Pollicino, Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle
of Equality Between Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint, 5 GERMAN L.J. 283, 289 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Case C-621/18, Wightman v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the Eur. Union,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 47 (Dec. 10, 2018) (“[A]ccording to settled case-law of the Court, the
interpretation of a provision of EU law requires that account be taken not only of its wording and
the objectives it pursues, but also of its context and the provisions of EU law as a whole.”); Case
C-104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie., 1982 E.C.R. 3641, ¶ 23 (“[I]t is
necessary to analyse the provision in the light of both the object and purpose of the Agreement
and of its context.”); Case C-312/91, In re Metalsa, 1993 E.C.R. I-3751, ¶ 11 (determining that
comparing two similar or identically-phrased provisions in different agreements “depends . . . on
the aim pursued by each provision in its particular context”); Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp.
v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 495, ¶ 2 (“[T]he Court must be free to consider the
facts of the case, taking into account the object and nature of the action.”); see also P.D.
Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256, 259 (1973)
(“The so-called teleological interpretation consistently applied by the European Court . . . is more
far-reaching: the Court construes Community law in a way promoting the objectives, the telos of
the Community.”).
30. Case 283/81, CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 20.
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union among the peoples of Europe.”31 The Treaties’ text32 and
academic scholarship33 also support “ever closer union” as the primary
purpose of the EU Treaties.
On its surface, the CJEU’s decision in Wightman might suggest
that the CJEU would consider a right of expulsion by Member States
as incompatible with this purpose and thus not retained.34 In Wightman,
the Court faced the question of whether a Member State could
unilaterally revoke an Article 50 TEU withdrawal notice.35 Textually,
Article 50 TEU makes no mention of whether this is possible.36
Nonetheless, the CJEU found that a notice of withdrawal could be

31. TEU, supra note 19 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Neth.
Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12 (“The objective of the [European Economic
Community] Treaty . . . is to establish a [c]ommon [m]arket.”); Case 1/91, Opinion of the Court,
1991 E.C.R. I-6099, ¶ 17 (“Article 1 of the Single European Act makes it clear moreover that the
objective of all the Community treaties is to contribute together to making concrete progress
toward[] European unity.”); Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 61 (holding that the Treaties
“have as their purpose the creation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”). For
a comprehensive list of CJEU caselaw invoking “ever closer union” as the Treaties’ purpose up
to 2015, see generally Vaughne Miller, “Ever Closer Union” in the EU Treaties and Court of
Justice Case Law (House of Commons Libr., Briefing Paper No. 07230, 2015), https://
researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7230/CBP-7230.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UK
Y-LKVC].
32. The first declaratory clause of the TFEU preamble states that the Member States are
“DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”
TFEU, supra note 10, at pmbl. (emphasis added). The next clause reinforces the first by
committing EU Member States “to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe.” Id. The TEU
similarly emphasizes this purpose. Article 1 TEU declares that the TEU “marks a new stage in
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,” as does the nearlyidentical clause in its preamble. TEU, supra note 19, at art. 1, pmbl. (emphasis added). The first,
third, and sixth declaratory clauses in the TEU Preamble follow suit. Id. at pmbl.
33. Gunnar Beck, The Court of Justice of the EU and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 35 Y.B. EUR. L. 484, 494 (2016) (“In important [CJEU] cases, however, the idea of ever
further integration is almost always implicit, as it is inseparable from the principles of the uniform
application of Union law as well as the effectiveness of Union law.”); see also Dagtoglou, supra
note 29, at 260 (“Integration is certainly a process and a goal at the same time and could as such
be described as a constitutional principle of the Community.”).
34. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
35. Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 16. The Court had an eye firmly trained on the U.K.,
which was then in the middle of negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU and, indeed, this was the
context in which the question was raised. See Giuseppe Martinico & Marta Simoncini, Wightman
and the Perils of Britain’s Withdrawal, 21 GERMAN L.J. 799, 801 (2020) (noting that it was “[i]n
the conundrum of Brexit negotiations” that members of the Scottish, U.K., and European
Parliaments “felt a responsibility to explore all the potential consequences of Article 50 TEU”).
36. See generally TEU, supra note 19, at art. 50 (including no reference to whether a state
can revoke its withdrawal notice).
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unilaterally revoked.37 It reasoned that because, “[A] state cannot be
forced to accede to the European Union against its will, neither can it
be forced to withdraw from the European Union against its will.”38 The
Court was concerned a Member State might, after submitting its
withdrawal notice, change its mind and still be forced to leave.39 Such
a result, the Court warned, “would be inconsistent with the Treaties’
purpose of creating an ever closer union.”40 Such logic might, at first
glance, suggest the Court would also interpret “ever closer union” as
precluding a retained right of Member States to expel other Member
States. Expulsion would terminate EU relations between Member
States without the expelled states’ consent and likely interfere with the
states’ will to remain within the treaty.
However, a closer reading of the Wightman judgement suggests
that the CJEU’s reasoning should be limited to only “forced
withdrawals” and that it should not be extended to preclude a retained
expulsion right. A forced withdrawal is not the same as expulsion; they
differ in where the legal entitlement lies. In a forced withdrawal, an
innocent State, legally entitled to remain within the treaty relationship,
might be coerced or bullied extralegally by its treaty partners to take
an affirmative, nonconsensual act. Such a state might itself take steps
to end the treaty relationship because of political, security, or other
nonlegal pressures by its treaty partners.41 In an expulsion, however, a
37. Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 69.
38. Id. ¶ 65.
39. See id. ¶ 66 (noting that “if the notification of the intention to withdraw were to lead
inevitably to the withdrawal of the Member State . . . that Member State could be forced to leave
the European Union despite its wish . . . to reverse its decision to withdraw and, accordingly, to
remain a Member of the European Union”).
40. Id. ¶ 67.
41. Take, for example, the pressure campaign leveled against South Africa by members of
the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) during apartheid. In 1961, the International Labor
Conference adopted a resolution, spearheaded by Nigeria, requesting that South Africa
voluntarily withdraw from the ILO “until such time as it abandoned the policy of apartheid.”
Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1381, 1412 (1964). South Africa refused, and because there was no expulsion provision in
the ILO constitution, it legally could not be forced out. See id. at 1412–13 (noting that because
“there was no provision for expulsion provision in the ILO constitution, South Africa was instead
invited to withdraw”). The legal entitlement of membership laid with South Africa. See generally
id. at 1412–16 (documenting that, because there was no expulsion provision in the ILO, South
Africa could not be denied membership or forced to withdraw against its consent). This did not
stop other members of the ILO from attempting to pressure it to withdraw. Id. The country’s
credentials were challenged in 1962, unsuccessfully. Id. Its representatives’ right to speak at the
1963 International Labor Conference were challenged, again unsuccessfully, and African and
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state has lost its entitlement to the treaty relationship because of its
treaty breach.42 It is not forced to take any nonconsensual act, but its
treaty partners also no longer have to extend the treaty relationship
toward it. It becomes a passive recipient of the consequences of its
breach.
Alternatively, it is possible CJEU used the words “withdraw” and
“leave” to refer to Article 50 TEU specifically, leaving general
questions of withdrawal or expulsion untouched. It certainly held that
no Member State can be forced to use the withdrawal mechanism of
Article 50 TEU,43 but it is unclear whether this principle is equally
applicable to retained CIL rights of withdrawal or expulsion generally.
The Court surely knew how to address questions of expulsion had it
wanted to.44 It did not, restricting its judgement to situations of forced
withdrawal. Indeed, only once did the Court mention the word
“expulsion” in its Judgement and only tangentially in its discussion on
Article 50 TEU,45 adopting a concern raised by the Advocate General
that an irrevocable withdrawal notice would convert Article 50 TEU
“into a means of expelling a Member State.”46 The Court’s narrow

Arab delegations withdrew from the conference in protest. Id. at 1414. Eventually, although the
ILO Governing Body could not stop South Africa from participating in the International Labor
Conference, it found it could exclude South African delegations “from those meetings of the ILO
at which membership is determined by the Governing Body.” Id. at 1415. Serious progress on
amendments to the ILO constitution to allow for expulsion of members in February 1964 finally
convinced South Africa to withdraw a month later. See id. (observing that after ILO amendments
relating to suspension and expulsion were drafted in February 1964, South Africa announced its
withdrawal on March 11, 1964).
42. See, e.g., id. at 1396 (noting that when the U.S.S.R. was expelled from the League of
Nations because of its invasion of Finland, it “lost all the rights and privileges of membership, and
all the reciprocal obligations between it and other members of the League came to an end”).
43. Case C-621/18, Wightman v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the Eur. Union,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 65 (Dec. 10, 2018).
44. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
45. See Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 68 (“[D]uring the drafting of [the withdrawal]
clause, amendments had been proposed to allow the expulsion of a Member State . . . .” (emphasis
added)). The court found that the non-adoption of an expulsion provision by the Lisbon Treaty
drafters supported “an interpretation of [the withdrawal] provision as meaning that a Member
State is entitled to revoke unilaterally the notification of its intention to withdraw from the
European Union.” Id.
46. Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Case C-621/18, Wightman,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:978, ¶ 112 (Dec. 4, 2018). The Advocate General noted “nothing in Article 50
TEU suggests that the withdrawal procedure may be converted into a means of expelling a
Member State” and that the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty “did not agree an amendment [sic]
which proposed supplementing the Member States’ voluntary right of withdrawal with a right of
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focus on the question of forced withdrawals should be read exactly that
way, narrowly, and should not be interpreted to address a retained
right of expulsion.
B. Construing the Treaties To Allow Expulsion Better Serves
“Ever Closer Union”
A closer analysis of Wightman reveals that the CJEU did not
foreclose expulsion. More importantly, though, construing the EU
Treaties to allow for expulsion of autocratic Member States better
ensures long-term EU unity and, therefore, better serves the EU
Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer union.” A jurisprudence that does not
allow for expulsion would encourage the continued violation of the
EU’s foundational values and wrongly prioritize short-term unity,
ultimately endangering the long-term survival of the EU project.
The CJEU’s use of teleological reasoning means that many cases
are decided on how well they enhance the purpose of the EU Treaties,
“ever closer union.”47 Neither the Treaties nor caselaw defines “ever
closer union,” so the meaning of this purpose must be found elsewhere.
That substance can be found in Article 2 TEU. Article 2 TEU advances
certain “common” values that the EU Member States themselves
considered foundational to “ever closer union.”48 The foundational
nature of these values to EU Member States is evidenced in several
ways, most notably in their role as legal requirements for newly
acceding Member States.49 The central role these values, including the
three specific values this Note will focus on, democracy, the rule of law,
and respect for human rights, played in the creation of the modern EU
indicate they should also be considered central to the purpose of the
EU’s, “ever closer union.” Autocracies that violate these foundational

expulsion from the European Union with regard to Member States that persistently infringed the
Union’s values.” Id.
47. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
48. Article 2 TEU reads in full:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.
TEU, supra note 19, at art. 2 (emphasis added).
49. These values were written into the text of Article 49 TEU, which governs accession of
new Member States; included in the Copenhagen criteria, additional accession requirements; and
given force by EU Member States in practice. See infra Part III.A.
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values, like Hungary or Poland, jeopardize the source of unity that
initially incentivized and currently binds EU Member States.
A jurisprudence that allows autocracies to remain in the EU
implicitly divorces “ever closer union” from the values articulated in
Article 2 TEU, disrupting Member State reliance interests by violating
the purpose for which those Members entered “ever closer union.” EU
unity and cooperation are based on the intertwined assumptions that
Member States adhere to Article 2 TEU’s values and that Member
States can rely on their fellow States to uphold those values.
Autocracies, however, hold values inherently incompatible with
Article 2 TEU; some, like Hungary, have both refused to uphold these
values and blatantly denounced them.50 By allowing autocracies that
reject Article 2 TEU’s values to remain Member States, the CJEU
divorces those values from the EU’s purpose of “ever closer union,”
disrupting those initial reliance interests.
Consider just the recent disruptions caused by Hungary. At the
time of this writing, Hungary has delayed the EU’s COVID-19
pandemic recovery plan and a “sanctions regime to target humanrights offenders”; it has blocked the transit of weapons through its
territory to Ukraine during the Russian invasion; and it has refused to
agree to an EU ban on Russian oil, effectively vetoing the measure.51
Orbán himself has also actively stoked discord between Hungary and
rest of the EU, denouncing “Brussels bureaucrats” as Hungary’s
“opponents.”52 Not only have seeds of the short-term disharmony
flowered between the EU and Hungary, but serious long-term conflict
has begun to propagate as Hungary repudiates the values that Member
States required and relied on when it joined the EU. Indeed,
commentators have warned that conflict would inevitably result from

50. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
51. Laurence Norman & Marcus Walker, Hungary’s Orban Threatens EU Unity on Russia,
WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2022, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungarys-orban-threatenseu-unity-on-russia-11652193712 [https://perma.cc/AR56-FXPR].
52. Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech Following the Election Victory of FideszKDNP (Apr. 3, 2022), https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-ministerviktor-orban-following-the-election-victory-of-fidesz-kdnp [https://perma.cc/4TT5-925A].
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this value disharmony,53 concerns that have proven prophetic.54 This
internal division not only has tangible real-world impacts but also
weakens EU institutional legitimacy,55 especially as the “EU’s own
claim to democratic legitimacy rests on the robust democratic
governments of its Member States.”56
A CJEU jurisprudence that uses the values in Article 2 TEU to
inform the Treaties’ purpose and affirms Member States’ right of
expulsion would better serve “ever closer union” by reducing this kind
of inter-EU conflict. Expulsion offers a way of ensuring value
conformity in the EU, thus preserving the values undergirding “ever
closer union.” Excluding autocracies would restore Member States’
reliance interests by revoking the benefits of EU membership. It would
also likely minimize greater down-the-road conflict between autocratic
and democratic states, which, as noted, has already been seen brewing
between Hungary and other Member States. In the face of EU
autocracies like Hungary, the CJEU can no longer act as a blind
“engine of integration.”57 Expulsion allows an out, literally, for those
states threatening the long-term viability of the EU project.
II. THE TERMINATION ARTICLE: ARTICLE 60 VCLT
Having established that the EU Treaties’ purpose is best served
by allowing the expulsion of states violating Article 2 TEU values, we

53. Professor Dagtoglou cautioned that “the admission of certain countries with
authoritarian governments” would result in “dangerous friction in [the EU’s] machinery” and
“would sooner or later tear the Community apart.” Dagtoglou, supra note 29, at 266. Other
authors have seconded this view, proffering that one of the only instances that might justify the
withdrawal of an EU Member State was if a government that fundamentally and openly rejected
the EU came to power. E.g., John A. Hill, The European Economic Community: The Right of
Member State Withdrawal, 12 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 335, 355 (1982). In that case, Hill (a prointegrationist scholar) conceded that “it probably would be preferable to permit that nation to
withdraw” rather than frustrate the Community’s purpose. Id.
54. See infra Part IV.A.
55. See Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order
After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 11 (2010) (“From another perspective, however, [the EU] is
an internally divided and externally weak global actor whose latest failed foray into constitutionmaking has further undermined its attempt to bootstrap its popular and political legitimacy.”).
56. Kim Lane Scheppele, Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov & Barbara Grabowska-Moroz,
EU Values Are Law, After All: Enforcing EU Values Through Systemic Infringement Actions by
the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union, 39 Y.B. EUR. L. 3, 15
(2020).
57. Luke Dimitrios Spieker, Breathing Life into the Union’s Common Values: On the Judicial
Application of Article 2 TEU in the EU Value Crisis, 20 GERMAN L.J. 1182, 1185 (2019).
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must now understand the law surrounding how that expulsion could be
effected. For that, we turn to the VCLT and, specifically, Article 60.58
No provision of the VCLT expressly permits the expulsion of
states from treaties.59 Instead, any “expulsion” right is implicit in
articles dealing with the termination or suspension of treaties.60 One of
these is Article 60.61

58. Also potentially relevant are the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts and their commentaries, written by the ILC. However, as noted by the ILC,
“[c]ountermeasures are to be clearly distinguished from the termination or suspension of treaty
relations on account of the material breach of a treaty by another State, as provided for in article
60 of the [VCLT].” Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
ch. II, para. 4, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/
56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Articles on Responsibility of States]. Because the suspension or
termination of a treaty does not “involve conduct taken in derogation from a subsisting treaty
obligation,” neither act qualifies as a “countermeasure” under the purview of Articles. Id.
59. See generally VCLT, supra note 21.
60. This is a subtle, but significant distinction. “True” expulsion is a power grounded in an
international organization that cannot be exercised unless expressly granted by the charter of the
organization. See NAGENDRA SINGH, TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 75 (1958) (stating that expulsion cannot be exercised unless “expressly
conferred on the organisation”). Termination of a treaty by mutual consent, however, is a state
power that “need not be specifically provided in the constituent instrument and would be
available to the member-State in the absence of express abrogation: the members being sovereign
are thus in a stronger position than the organisation.” Id. at 76. It should be noted Singh wrote in
1958, over ten years prior to VCLT’s signing in 1969. The VCLT introduced an avenue wholly
unconsidered by Singh: de facto expulsion via the unanimous termination of the treaty in relation
to a materially breaching party. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60.
61. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60. It reads in full:
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in
whole or in part.
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty
in whole or in part or to terminate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or
(ii) as between all the parties;
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending
the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the
defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the
treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party
radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of
its obligations under the treaty.
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty.
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Article 60 VCLT outlines the conditions necessary for the
termination or suspension of a treaty as a consequence of its breach.62
The article tries to strike a balance between preserving the
international principle of pacta sunt servanda, i.e. that agreements must
be kept,63 and preserving the rights of injured state parties vis-à-vis
their breaching partners.64 This balancing results from the nature of
international law, where the absence of international enforcement
mechanisms means that “the protection and enforcement of rights is to
a large degree left to self-help mechanisms to be employed by the
individual international actors.”65 Those self-help mechanisms are

4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty
applicable in the event of a breach.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human
person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions
prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties.
Id.
It should be noted that commentators debate whether Article 60 VCLT fully constitutes
CIL; however, the ICJ has consistently supported the Article 60 as codifying CIL. In its Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, for example, the
court found that the rules relating to treaty termination in the VCLT “may in many respects be
considered as a codification of existing customary law on the subject.” Legal Consequences for
States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 94 (June 21). The
Court also twice noted in its Gab íkovo-Nagymaros decision that Article 60 was declaratory of
CIL. Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 46, 99 (Sept. 25).
62. This includes treaties that form international organizations. VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1038 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012)
[hereinafter Dörr & Schmalenbach] (“[Article 60] could be used to expel Member States from
international organizations for having committed a material breach of the constituent instrument,
where that instrument contains neither express nor implied rules regulating that matter.”); see
also MOHAMMED M. GOMAA, SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF TREATIES ON GROUNDS OF
BREACH 125 (1996) (noting that “[c]onstituent instruments of international organizations” must
adhere to Vienna Convention rules “unless they expressly provide different rules”).
63. See Pacta Sunt Servanda, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[Latin
‘agreements must be kept’] (1847) The rule that agreements and stipulations, esp. those contained
in treaties, must be observed.”); see also MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 363 (2009) (describing pacta sunt servanda as
“the cornerstone of international relations”).
64. See Dörr & Schmalenbach, supra note 62, at 1023–24 (describing how Article 60 attempts
to find a balance between keeping agreements and protecting injured parties from negative
consequences of treaty breaches).
65. Id. at 1023; see also GOMAA, supra note 62, at 118 (“The faculty to terminate or suspend
the operation of a treaty is not a legal consequence of material breach. It is a form of non-violent
self-help taken as a lawful response for such breach.”); SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY
107 (1985) (“Historically international law is self-policing.”).
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highly restrained to ensure that states do not use alleged breaches as a
pretext to shirk their obligations.66
This Note will focus on Article 60 paragraph 2(a), which provides
for the suspension or termination of a multilateral treaty by unanimous
agreement of the nonbreaching parties.67 Two primary elements bear
discussion: (1) material breach and (2) unanimity.68

66. VILLIGER, supra note 63, at 739; see also Dörr & Schmalenbach, supra note 62, at 1023
(noting that “it should not be too easy for States to turn a perhaps fictitious treaty violation into
a pretext for terminating treaties that they no longer approve”).
67. See VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60(2)(a) (stating that nonbreaching parties may
unanimously “suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or . . . terminate it either: (i)
in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or (ii) as between all the parties”).
As the EU Treaties are by no definition bilateral, paragraph 1 is of no use here. See id. at art.
60(1) (referring only to “material breach of a bilateral treaty”). Nor is there reason to believe that
material breaches by Hungary would specially affect another Member State per paragraph 2(b)
or change Member States’ obligations to it radically enough to trigger paragraph 2(c). See id. at
art. 60(2)(b)–(c) (stating that paragraph 2(b) applies only to “a party specially affected by the
breach” and paragraph 2(c) applies only to situations where a breach “radically changes the
position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the
treaty”).
68. It should be noted that generally all countermeasures in international law are subject to
the principle of proportionality, under which no countermeasure can be disproportionate to the
breach committed. See Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 58, at art. 35 (outlining
that per Article 35(b), a state that has breached has an obligation to make restitution provided
that restitution “[d]oes not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from
restitution instead of compensation”); see also Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of
Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM J. INT’L L. 715, 738 (discussing proportionality in
the context of nonmilitary countermeasures). It is disputed whether the principle of
proportionality should be considered as “prebuilt in” to Article 60 VCLT or whether an
additional, separate proportionality analysis is required. Compare GOMAA, supra note 62, at 120
(arguing that the principle of proportionality “does not need to be observed”), and THE VIENNA
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1373–75 (Olivier Corten & Pierre
Klein eds., 2011) [hereinafter Corten & Klein] (distinguishing between Article 60’s regime and
other reprisals, countermeasures, or responses to violations of a treaty, which are subject to
proportionality), with Dörr & Schmalenbach, supra note 62, at 1037 (arguing the structure of
Article 60 paragraph 2 suggests it is subject to proportionality), and VILLIGER, supra note 63, at
740 (noting that suspension must be utilized before termination pursuant to the principle of
proportionality). This author views the expulsion of Hungary from the EU as satisfying
proportionality, regardless of which approach is correct. This is due to the severity and prolonged,
intentional duration of Hungary’s violations of Article 2 TEU. There exist few other peaceful
violations that would so deeply violate the root of the EU Treaties as the transformation of a
democratic Member State into an autocratic one. Moreover, Hungary’s awareness of its violations
and refusal to remedy them, even after extensive warnings from the EU since at least 2011, display
a conscious commitment to those breaches. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 5 July
2011 on the Revised Hungarian Constitution, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2011)0315; infra notes
162–163.
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Per paragraph 1, Article 60 VCLT requires that a breach rise to
the level of a “material breach” before it can be grounds for the
suspension or termination of a treaty by the injured parties.69 Article
60, paragraph 3 VCLT defines “material breach” as either “a
repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the . . . Convention” or “the
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object
or purpose of the treaty.”70 This Note will focus on the latter definition.
Two aspects of material breaches bear mentioning. First, a
material breach must violate a “provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.”71 An
“essential” provision in the context of paragraph 3(b) is one that goes
to the root of the treaty72 or that induced a party to enter into the treaty
initially.73
Second, a material breach must violate a provision essential to the
“object or purpose of the treaty.”74 This phrase refers to “the reasons
for which [the treaty] was concluded.”75 “Any object or purpose” is
eligible.76 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has been
unwilling to allow the object or purpose of a treaty to be defined too
abstractly, though. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, it distinguished between “the broad category of unfriendly
acts” that did not defeat the treaty’s object or purpose, and “the
narrower category of acts” that did.77 The ICJ refused to grant
wholesale that all “unfriendly acts” taken by the United States against
Nicaragua violated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between them.78
69. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60(1).
70. Id. at art. 60(3).
71. Id. at art. 60(3)(b) (emphasis added).
72. GOMAA, supra note 62, at 31.
73. VILLIGER, supra note 63, at 743. And the violation of “essential” provision may include
violations of ancillary, rather than being limited to only “central” treaty provisions. Id.; Dörr &
Schmalenbach, supra note 62, at 1031; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE
260 (3d ed. 2013); GOMAA, supra note 62, at 31.
74. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60(3)(b) (emphasis added).
75. GOMAA, supra note 62, at 29.
76. VILLIGER, supra note 63, at 742–43.
77. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 273 (June 27).
78. Id. The Court eventually did find some concrete acts by the United States violated the
Treaty’s object and purpose. See id. ¶ 275 (“[The Court] does consider that there are certain
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In the case of the EU Treaties, then, an essential provision must
be some provision that induces current EU Member States to integrate
with potential EU Member States in furtherance of the object and
purpose of the EU Treaties, namely “ever closer union.”
B. Unanimity
Paragraph 2(a) of Article 60 declares that a multilateral treaty may
be suspended or terminated in whole or in part “by unanimous
agreement” of the other parties.79 Upon that unanimous agreement, the
nonbreaching states may either suspend or terminate the treaty
amongst all parties (effectively ending the treaty) or uniformly
terminate the treaty relations between themselves and the breaching
state, while still keeping treaty relations amongst each other alive
(effectively expelling the breaching state).80
Unanimous agreement of the “other parties” does not require
agreement by the breaching state itself.81 The breaching state “is
precluded from taking any part in the decision on the consequences of
its breach.”82 Even so, unanimity stands as the largest hurdle toward
achieving expulsion of Hungary from the EU because of the immense
political will required to meet it.83
Therefore, to legally invoke the expulsion mechanism of Article
60 VCLT paragraph 2(a), the EU must demonstrate and agree that (a)
Hungary materially breached its obligations under the EU Treaties by
(b) violating a provision essential to (c) the object or purpose of the
Treaties, and (d) the agreement by EU Member States must be
unanimous.

activities of the United States which are such as to undermine the whole spirit of a bilateral
agreement directed to sponsoring friendship between the two States parties to it.”).
79. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60(2)(a) (emphasis added).
80. Id.; see also GOMAA, supra note 62, at 101 (noting that “when all the parties find
themselves in the same situation vis-à-vis the defaulting one,” they can “decide to adopt a uniform
position which applies to the relations of each of them individually towards the wrong-doing
party, but still keeping the treaty alive”); Dörr & Schmalenbach, supra note 62 (“The fate of the
treaty as a whole as well as the defaulting State’s position as a party are left to the discretion of
the other members of the treaty community: they are free even . . . to expel the defaulting State.”)
(emphasis omitted).
81. GOMAA, supra note 62, at 102; see also VILLIGER, supra note 63, at 744 (noting the
innocent parties can, by unanimous agreement, “suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or
in part” and that “[u]nanimity does not include the defaulting State”).
82. GOMAA, supra note 62, at 102.
83. See infra Part IV.C.
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III. EXPELLING ORBÁN’S HUNGARY

Having outlined the relevant law, this Part applies that law to
Hungary. It has already been established that the EU Treaties’ purpose
is “ever closer union.” This Part will first demonstrate that Article 2
TEU is a provision essential to the accomplishment of that purpose.
Second, it will argue that Hungary has violated Article 2 TEU, and
therefore that Hungary should be expelled from the EU. And finally,
it will ask if the expulsion of Hungary can be accomplished if Poland
opposes it, given Article 60 VCLT’s unanimity requirement.
A. Provision Essential: EU Values in Article 2 TEU
Three indicators suggest that Article 2 TEU and its values
represent a provision essential to the Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer
union”: Article 49 TEU, its associated Copenhagen criteria for
Member State accession, and EU state practice. First, Article 49 TEU
textually links the Article 2 TEU values to “ever closer union.” Article
49 TEU, which outlines the process and requirements of acceding to
the EU, begins: “Any European State which respects the values referred
to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become
a member of the Union.”84 The article’s first sentence demonstrates the
Member States’ intent to link Article 2 TEU’s values to EU
membership; to be part of the EU’s “ever closer union” entails
respecting and promoting those values. This kind of mechanism
empowers Article 2 TEU’s values as not just political objectives, but
legal restraints on EU action.
Second, the Copenhagen criteria further confirm the essential
nature of the Article 2 TEU values.85 At the 1993 Copenhagen
European Council, the EU Member States codified new “essential
conditions” for accession, colloquially called the Copenhagen criteria.86
The first of these criteria requires many of the same foundational
values found in Article 2 TEU: “Membership requires that the
84. TEU, supra note 19, at art. 49 (emphasis added).
85. It should be noted that the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999,
required in its amendment to Article O much the same as its eventual successor Article 49 TEU.
Article O required that acceding Member States respect the principles found in Article F(1),
which contained most of the same values as would eventually be articulated in Article 2 TEU.
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 1, ¶ 15, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.
86. Accession Criteria, EUR. COMM’N, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/en
largement-policy/glossary/accession-criteria_en [https://perma.cc/9PQ4-4A57].
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candidate country has . . . achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
and protection of minorities . . . .”87 Though Article 49 TEU makes no
mention of the Copenhagen criteria as such, the requirements have
been read into it.88 The redundancy of explicit guarantees in the
Copenhagen criteria and implicit guarantees in Article 49 TEU is a
product of not only the EU’s constitutional evolution over time,89 but
also the Member States’ determined intent to center EU membership
with those values. Respect for those values seems to be a core
inducement to EU Member States when admitting new states.90
Accordingly, a violation of Article 2 TEU is one that goes to the heart
of treaty relationships amongst EU Member States and severely
infringes their ability to effect “ever closer union.”
Finally, EU state practice also suggests Member States view
Article 2 TEU values as essential to the EU Treaties’ purpose. The
accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal were all conditioned on the
acceptance of democratic institutions.91 In fact, Greece’s accession
process was suspended when a coup in 1967 brought a junta to power,
and Spain’s first attempt to enter the EEC while under the rule of
Francisco Franco was declined.92 Recent expansions of the EU into

87. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, at 13 (June 21–22, 1993); see
also Accession Criteria, supra note 86 (describing the Copenhagen criteria as “essential conditions
all candidate countries must satisfy to become a member state”).
88. EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 468 (Ramses A.
Wessel & Joris Larik eds., 2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter Wessel & Larik].
89. The Copenhagen criteria were established in 1993 and included in the 1999 Treaty of
Amsterdam (Article O) and the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (Article 49 TEU). Accession Criteria,
supra note 86. The Copenhagen criteria were eventually explicitly constitutionalized through
Articles O and 49 and yet still function as an implicit guarantee of those values. The Treaty of
Amsterdam amended then-Article F (the predecessor of Article 2 TEU) and Article O (the
predecessor of Article 49 TEU). Treaty of Amsterdam art. 1, ¶¶ 8, 15. Article F(1) was amended
to explicitly enunciate the founding values of the EU and reads: “The Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” Id. at art. 1, ¶ 8. Article O was
amended to read: “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article F(l) may
apply to become a member of the Union.” Id. at art. 1, ¶ 15.
90. For example, EU Member States have displayed historic resistance to admitting states
that did not ascribe to those Article 2 values. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
91. Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny, in EU ENLARGEMENT:
A LEGAL APPROACH 1, 4–5 (Christophe Hillion ed., 2004). Greece eventually successfully
acceded to the EU in 1981, and Spain and Portugal both acceded in 1986. Wessel & Larik, supra
note 88, at 462.
92. Hillion, supra note 91, at 4–5 nn.9–10.
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Romania and Bulgaria have also included both pre and postaccession
mechanisms to ensure the entrenchment of these values.93 This
practical fealty to the values in Article 2 TEU indicates that Member
States view them as actually indispensable parts of their treaty
relationships and essential to “ever closer union.”
B. Hungary’s Material Breaches
Having established that Article 2 TEU values are essential to the
purpose of forming an “ever closer union,” our analysis must now
address whether Hungary has breached these values. This Note will
focus on three of Article 2 TEU’s most important values: “democracy,”
“rule of law,” and “respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities.”94 Defining these obligations with
precision is problematic. Jurisprudence from the CJEU to make
concrete these abstract terms is sparse, so this Note will rely on the
work of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”) to define these obligations.95 Three areas of
Hungarian action evidence its breaches of its democracy, rule of law,
and respect for human rights obligations, respectively: (1) election
control and media consolidation; (2) judiciary capture; and (3) attacks
on minority groups.
1. Breaches of Democracy: Hungary’s Election Control and Media
Consolidation. Given that Hungary has an obligation to uphold
“democracy” per Article 2 TEU, what might a “democracy” obligation
mean? Article 3 of the Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights declares that a “democracy” must “hold free elections
at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will

93. See Wessel & Larik, supra note 88, at 476–77 (describing, for example, one provision
“giving the Council the possibility to postpone the envisaged date of accession by twelve months
should the acceding countries fail to fulfil their commitments” and another establishing a
“Cooperation and Verification Mechanism” to assess countries’ progress postaccession).
94. TEU, supra note 19, at art. 2.
95. The Council of Europe is “the continent’s leading human rights organisation” and boasts
47 member states, 27 of which are also part of the EU (including Hungary). Who We Are,
COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/79X9-9Y
9S]; Values, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values [https://perma.cc/
5FPG-VH27] (“The Council of Europe advocates freedom of expression and of the media,
freedom of assembly, equality and the protection of minorities.”). A subgroup of constitutional
experts in the Council, called the Venice Commission, also evaluates constitutional structures in
member states and offers advice to better safeguard democratic institutions. Id.
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ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of
the legislature.”96 This skeleton has been given flesh in subsequent
Council reports; “[s]table democrac[y]” now requires free and fair
elections, strong checks on majoritarian power, legislative branches
that are able to shape legislation, opposition parties that are able to
meaningfully participate in government, and the protection of the rule
of law.97 Fidesz’s subversion and control of Hungarian elections via
gerrymandering, electoral changes, and government consolidation of
the media have violated these core tenets of “democracy” and
therefore Hungary’s obligations under Article 2 TEU.
Antidemocratic measures designed to lock out opposition parties
and lock in Fidesz rule were a top priority for Orbán and Fidesz after
they swept into power in April 2010.98 That election saw the FideszChristian Democracy Party coalition win 68 percent of the seats in the
Hungarian parliament,99 giving them just over two-thirds of the
parliament’s seats—the critical threshold needed to amend the
constitution.100 It quickly constitutionalized new, heavily
gerrymandered election districts101 and cracked opposition-friendly
districts, diluting opposition party power by merging opposition
96. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
97. THORBJØRN JAGLAND, SEC’Y GEN., COUNCIL OF EUR., STATE OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: POPULISM—HOW STRONG ARE EUROPE’S CHECKS
AND BALANCES? 77 (2017).
98. Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2014, 8:28 AM) [hereinafter Scheppele, Hungary, Part 2], https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.bl
ogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-2 [https://perma.cc/39YP-YW
SA] (positing that “Fidesz started immediately after its election victory in 2010 to reshape the
electoral system to ensure its hold on power”).
99. Kriszta Kovács & Kim Lane Scheppele, The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary:
Lessons from Hungary and Poland—and the European Union, 51 COMMUNIST & POSTCOMMUNIST STUD. 189, 191 (2018); Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele,
Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 138–39 (2012).
100. Bánkuti et al., supra note 99.
101. Scheppele, Hungary, Part 2, supra note 98. The Venice Commission defines
“gerrymandering” as a “negative and manipulative act of politicians to redraw the legislative/
electoral district boundaries to deprive the representation that another group or party would
enjoy.” EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L. (VENICE COMM’N), COUNCIL OF EUR.,
REPORT ON CONSTITUENCY DELINEATION AND SEAT ALLOCATION 22 (2017) [hereinafter
VENICE COMM’N]. It “distorts the democratic electoral process, undermines democratic and
universal election principles, and renders legislative elections a meaningless exercise.” Id. Some
of the smallest districts had a 50 percent deviation from the largest districts. Scheppele, Hungary,
Part 2, supra note 98. For reference, the Venice Commission recommends that districts deviate
no more than 10 percent from each other. VENICE COMM’N, supra, at 12 n.95.

SANFILIPPO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2022 1:45 PM

698

[Vol. 72:675

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

districts with Fidesz-friendly districts.102 These efforts have made it
substantially harder for opposition parties to win seats in parliament;
to win a simple party majority, opposition parties have to receive 6 to
8 percent more votes than Fidesz.103
Arcane new election laws enacted by Fidesz to push out
opposition parties also made fair elections impossible. Fidesz replaced
Hungary’s traditional two-round electoral system with a one-round
system;104 shortened the period for collecting signatures for candidacy,
burdening less organized and less national parties; and, critically, gave
a greater allocation of votes to the dominant party, Fidesz.105 In 2020,
the threshold for minority parties to be eligible for election to the
parliament’s open party-list seats was drastically tightened, requiring
minority parties to field a candidate in at least seventy-one districts
(instead of the twenty-seven previously required).106 This constricts the
ability of minority parties in Hungary to win any of the party-list seats
unless they operate on a nationwide scale, something not feasible for
many, and allows Fidesz to pick up the empty seats.
Erosion of opposition parties’ ability to compete fairly in elections
has also occurred via an overhaul of the Hungarian media landscape
by Fidesz. Attacks began in 2010 when Fidesz passed a law
restructuring the country’s Media Authority and “created a fivemember independent Media Council with powers to levy hefty

102. Zack Beauchamp, It Happened There: How Democracy Died in Hungary, VOX (Sept. 13,
2018, 9:30 AM) [hereinafter Beauchamp, It Happened There], https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungary-democracy-authoritarianism-trump [https://perma.cc/HL6Q
-ACBN] (noting that “[p]arliamentary districts were redrawn and gerrymandered to give Fidesz
a leg up” and “[l]iberal bastions, principally large cities like Budapest and Szeged in the south,
were divided so that large numbers of people were packed into a handful of parliamentary
districts”).
103. Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 3, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2014, 8:33 AM), https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-anelection-in-question-part-3 [https://perma.cc/6XYB-X87M].
104. This Fidesz-passed “reform” replaced Hungary’s traditional two-round run-off system
with a single-round, first-past-the-post system for parliamentary elections. See Scheppele,
Hungary, Part 2, supra note 98. Under this new electoral system, Fidesz could (and would) win
their newly-created, heavily-gerrymandered districts with only a plurality of a district’s vote. Id.
The prior two-round run-off system required Fidesz, or any candidate, to receive at least fifty
percent (a majority) of a district’s vote; otherwise, a run-off is held between the highest votegetters. Id.
105. Id.
106. Végh, supra note 7.
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fines.”107 All seats were packed with Fidesz loyalists.108 Control of the
Council bore fruit during the 2014 parliamentary elections, where the
OSCE concluded that Fidesz “enjoyed an undue advantage because of
restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign
activities that blurred the separation between political party and the
State.”109
The decline of pro-opposition media and the concentration of the
media market in the hands of pro-Fidesz figures has continued since
via “legal changes, media acquisitions, and political pressure.”110 The
government has “tak[en] over the public service media provider
(including the national television and radio service and the national
news agency) and turn[ed] it into a government propaganda machine,
buying up private media companies and starting countless new ones
primarily financed by the state.”111 Using its discretion to award public
advertising campaigns, the government has given contracts to progovernment media, while pro-opposition media outlets have been
driven out of business or sold.112 Media outlets have also continued to
overwhelmingly concentrate in the hands of Orbán allies.113 By 2017, it

107. Bánkuti et al., supra note 99, at 140.
108. Id.
109. OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUM. RTS., ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR.,
HUNGARY: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 6 APRIL 2014: OSCE/ODIHR LIMITED ELECTION
OBSERVATION MISSION FINAL REPORT 1 (2014).
110. Gábor Filippov, Nations in Transit 2020: Hungary, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedom
house.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020 [https://perma.cc/5TPD-YQZB].
111. Tamás Bodoky, This Is How Fidesz Reintroduced One-Party Rule over the Media System
in Hungary, ATLATSZO (Nov. 11, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://english.atlatszo.hu/2019/11/11/this-ishow-fidesz-reintroduced-one-party-rule-over-the-media-system-in-hungary [https://perma.cc/6X
3F-AVCU].
112. See Hegedüs, supra note 7 (“Due to the support of the deeply biased public media and
important acquisitions in the television, online, and print segment, progovernment outlets have
come to dominate the market to an overwhelming degree unimaginable even a year earlier.”); see
also OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUM. RTS., ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR., HUNGARY:
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 8 APRIL 2018, ODIHR LIMITED ELECTION OBSERVATION
MISSION FINAL REPORT 18 (2018) [hereinafter ODIHR 2018 REPORT] (discussing closures of
opposition media outlets).
113. See PARTNER ORGS. TO THE COUNCIL OF EUR. PLATFORM TO PROMOTE THE PROT. OF
JOURNALISM & SAFETY OF JOURNALISTS, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: THREATS AND ATTACKS
AGAINST MEDIA FREEDOM IN EUROPE 25–26 (2019) (describing the strong influence of the
Hungarian government on the media and the challenges that the few remaining independent
outlets face); ODIHR 2018 REPORT, supra note 112, at 17 (“Since 2014, most international media
groups have left the market, enabling a growing concentration of media ownership in the hands
of party-affiliated entrepreneurs at the national and regional levels.”); Filippov, supra note 110
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was estimated that over 90 percent of all media in Hungary was
controlled by Fidesz and its allies.114 Control of the media resulted in a
“pervasive influx of government publicity campaigns” in the 2018
election that “was largely indistinguishable from Fidesz campaigning,
giving it a clear advantage.”115
The combined effects of Fidesz’s efforts—gerrymandering
districts, allocating more votes to itself, raising eligibility requirements
for minority parties, and using national media to perpetuate pro-Fidesz
messaging—have “effectively rigged the political system to give Fidesz
a nigh-insurmountable edge.”116 This stands in blatant opposition to the
necessary elements of “democracy” per the Council of Europe. Fidesz
permanently sidelines minority parties with elections that might be
technically free, but are systemically unfair. Indeed, the degree of
media control Fidesz has amassed gives it an “unprecedented”
advantage over opposition parties, ensuring that any participation of
opposition parties is marginal, at best.117 By controlling the elections
and owning the media, Fidesz has also dismantled all electoral checks
on its power to manipulate the Hungarian electorate in the future; its
perpetual control of the parliament further ensures that legislation
encounters little, if any, scrutiny. In essence, Fidesz has ensured that
election outcomes are not competitive; they are inevitable.118

(“[Hungary] has . . . captured the public media and taken control over large segments of private
media through an extensive network of government-friendly oligarchs.”).
114. Marius Dragomir, The State of Hungarian Media: Endgame, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. &
POL. SCI. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2017/08/29/the-state-of-hungarianmedia-endgame [https://perma.cc/YFU9-FDH5].
115. ODIHR 2018 REPORT, supra note 112, at 13, 17 (emphasis omitted). The OSCE also
found a “pervasive overlap [of messaging] between the ruling coalition and the government” in
the 2022 election. OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUM. RTS., ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR.
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION: HUNGARY
– PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM, 3 APRIL 2022: STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1 (2022) [hereinafter ODIHR 2022 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS].
116. Beauchamp, It Happened There, supra note 102.
117. See INT’L PRESS INST., EUR. CTR. FOR PRESS & MEDIA FREEDOM, EUR. FED’N OF
JOURNALISTS, ART. 19, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS FOR
FREEDOM OF INFO. & FREE PRESS UNLIMITED, CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT INTERNATIONAL
PRESS FREEDOM MISSION TO HUNGARY 1–2 (2019) (“Readers and viewers who do not actively
look for alternative sources of news (mainly online) receive a virtually exclusively government
narrative given the government’s level of control over the print, radio and television markets.”).
118. Beauchamp, It Happened There, supra note 102 (“Elections there are free, in the sense
that the vote counts aren’t nakedly rigged. But they are unfair: The government controls the
airwaves and media companies to such a degree that the opposition can’t get a fair hearing.”).
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2. Breaches of the “Rule of Law”: Fidesz’s Court Capture. Fidesz’s
campaign against, and eventual capture of, the Hungarian judiciary
similarly violates the core elements of its “rule of law” obligations
under Article 2 TEU. The Council of Europe views the “rule of law”
as requiring six elements.119 Of relevance here are “[a]ccess to [j]ustice
before independent and impartial courts,” “[r]espect for human
rights,” and “[n]on-discrimination and equality before the law.”120
Fidesz took decisive action early on to neuter the independence of
the judiciary and to ensure that the Hungarian court system was
controlled by Fidesz. It began with the Hungarian Constitutional
Court. Three months after its 2010 win, Fidesz passed a constitutional
amendment altering the selection process for court justices to allow it
unilateral control over the nomination process.121 Another amendment
raised the number of justices on the Constitutional Court from eleven
to fifteen, allowing Fidesz to immediately appoint four new justices.122
Fidesz’s passage of the Fourth Amendment “marked the final capture
of the Constitutional Court”123: it nullified all case law from the court
from 1990 to 2011 and limited the court’s jurisdiction by preventing the
court from reviewing the compatibility of constitutional amendments
with Hungary’s Fundamental Law.124
The lower courts were not spared either. In 2011, Fidesz lowered
the age of compulsory retirement of judges from seventy to sixty-two,
which forced between 10 and 15 percent of all Hungarian judges into
retirement.125 This disproportionally impacted independent,
entrenched senior judges and those in leadership in the courts who

119. These six elements are: (1) “[l]egality (supremacy of the law)”; (2) “[l]egal certainty”; (3)
“[p]rohibition of arbitrariness”; (4) “[a]ccess to [j]ustice before independent and impartial
courts”; (5) “[r]espect for human rights”; and (6) “[n]on-discrimination and equality before the
law.” EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L. (VENICE COMM’N), COUNCIL OF EUR.,
REPORT ON THE RULE OF LAW 15–16 (2011).
120. Id.
121. Bánkuti et al., supra note 99, at 139. The old system had required “a majority of
parliamentary parties to agree to a nomination and then a two-thirds vote of parliament’s
members to elect the nominee to the Court.” Id. Fidesz disposed of any requirement of multiparty
political consensus, unilaterally allowing its two-thirds to elect justices to the Court. Id.
122. Id. at 140.
123. Kovács & Scheppele, supra note 99.
124. Id. This included blocking review of the Fourth Amendment itself. Id.
125. Id. at 192.
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might act as pockets of resistance to Fidesz.126 The EU Commission
brought an infringement proceeding against Hungary, citing
unjustifiable age discrimination, and subsequently won.127 However,
the remedy was compensation, not reinstatement of the judges to their
former positions.128 The Hungarian government paid the compensation
and largely avoided having to restore the judges to their former
posts.129
As it purged older judges en masse and appointed party loyalists
to their seats, Fidesz also worked to maintain that loyalty by instituting
a new judicial disciplinary mechanism.130 It established a newly created
National Judicial Office (“NJO”), whose president “has the power to
select new judges, to promote and demote any judge, to begin
disciplinary proceedings, and to select the leaders of each of the
courts.”131 The president can also reassign cases to courts of their
choosing.132 The president’s “sweeping powers give [them] control over
every aspect of a judge’s career,” ensuring that judicial autonomy is
inextricably linked to the whims of the president and their party.133
The capture of the Hungarian judiciary via court packing, mass
firings, and the creation of the disciplinary NJO severely betrays the
core rule of law tenets set out by the Council of Europe. Any
independence or impartiality the Hungarian judiciary may have had
certainly disappeared after Fidesz stacked the judiciary with party
loyalists, disciplined by their handpicked NJO president. Fidesz’s
efforts, like its age discrimination against lower court judges, seemed
aimed at removing independent judges who might oppose its political
126. See id. (“The vast majority of senior judges – between 10 and 15% of all judges in the
country, and disproportionately including judges in the leadership of the courts – were forced to
leave the bench almost immediately.”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 192–93.
131. Bánkuti et al., supra note 99, at 143.
132. Kovács & Scheppele, supra note 99, at 192–93.
133. Id. at 193. As of this writing, both holders of the NJO presidency have been members of
the Fidesz party. Until recently, this post was filled by Tünde Handó, whose husband is a founding
member of the Fidesz party. Joshua Rozenberg, Meet Tünde Handó, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012,
1:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/mar/20/tunde-hando-hungarian-judges [https://
perma.cc/6SN8-T6MW]. In 2019, Fidesz member György Barna Senyei was appointed.
Hungarian President Names Budapest Judge To Lead Powerful Judiciary Office, REUTERS (Dec.
2, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-court-idUSKBN1Y623T [https://
perma.cc/P7P2-59SH].
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project.134 Any attempt by the judiciary to push back resulted in
ruthless jurisdiction-limiting retaliation, further curtailing judicial
independence.135 Indeed, because of the NJO president’s sweeping
disciplinary powers, a Hungarian judge’s career is effectively
determined by the Fidesz-controlled executive or legislative
branches.136 By annihilating the judiciary’s independence first, Fidesz
also ensured it would have a free hand to manipulate elections,
consolidate the media, and attack minorities, eroding “democracy” and
human rights protections without judicial resistance.
3. Breaches of Human Rights: Fidesz’s Attacks on Minority and
Marginalized Groups.
Hungary also has an obligation to
“respect . . . human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
minorities” per Article 2 TEU.137 In its case law, the CJEU has held
that human rights treaties that Member States have collaborated on
and signed can provide the Court guidance on “human rights.”138 It has
described the European Convention on Human Rights (“the
Convention”) as having “special significance” in its human rights
jurisprudence.139 In fact, in a 2018 judgement, the CJEU went so far as
to hold that Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights140 and

134. Cf. Kovács & Scheppele, supra note 99, at 191–92 (arguing that the “Constitutional Court
was effectively neutralized as a check on government” after being packed by Fidesz’s majority
and observing that Fidesz’s gambit to lower the retirement age of judges had the effect of forcing
the “vast majority of senior judges . . . disproportionately including judges in the leadership of the
courts . . . to leave the bench almost immediately”).
135. See id. at 191 (noting that when the Court struck down a 98 percent retroactive tax on
government severance bonuses “the governing coalition amended the old constitution . . . to
restrict the competencies of the Constitutional Court”).
136. This stands in direct violation of the Legal Criteria for Judicial Independence, which
include that “[t]he judiciary has independent decision-making powers, and its decisions are
respected.” THORBJØRN JAGLAND, COUNCIL OF EUR., STATE OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: A SECURITY IMPERATIVE FOR EUROPE 16 (2016).
137. TEU, supra note 19, at art. 2.
138. Case C-4/73, Nold v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1977 E.C.R. 492, ¶ 13.
139. Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, 1991
E.C.R. I-2951, ¶ 41.
140. Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights reads: “Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
The Charter, per Article 6 TEU, has “the same legal value as the Treaties” and “[f]undamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms . . . shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.” TEU, supra
note 19, at art. 6.
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Article 8 of the Convention “have the same meaning and the same
scope.”141 Thus, the Convention’s definition of “human rights” can help
inform Member States’ obligations under Article 2 TEU’s own
obligation. And if Fidesz-passed laws violate Hungary’s Convention
obligations, that would provide strong evidence that they similarly
violate the CJEU’s understanding of “human rights” under Article 2
TEU.
So, how does the ECHR, which interprets the Convention, define
a violation of “human rights,” specifically in the context of LGBTQ+
rights?142 There is not a single definition of the phrase, but the
Convention imposes both negative and positive obligations on its
members. Among others, states must enact and enforce measures to
prevent individuals from being subjected to ill treatment,143 and
specifically must provide effective domestic justice systems to
investigate and punish discrimination-based crimes.144 States may not
exclude same-sex couples from civil unions if civil unions are offered

141. Case C-673/16, Coman v. Inspectoratul General pentru Imigr ri, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, ¶
49 (June 5, 2018).
142. Although this Note focuses on LGTBQ+ discrimination, by no means are LGBTQ+
persons the only group facing persecution by the Fidesz government. Discrimination against other
vulnerable groups, like the homeless, the Roma, and refugees is also persistent and used by Fidesz
for political gain. See, e.g., Kara Fox, Hungary’s Constitution Makes Street Homelessness a Crime,
CNN (Oct. 15, 2018, 9:54 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/europe/hungary-criminalizeshomelessness-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/G7W9-FDSU] (describing “the government’s policy
of policing homeless people off the street”); Csengel Karina, According to Viktor Orbán, in
Gyongyospata “the Roma Developed the Feeling that They Were in the Majority,” MÉRCE (Jan.
31, 2020), https://merce.hu/2020/01/31/Orbán-viktor-szerint-gyongyospatan-az-az-erzes-alakultki-a-romakban-hogy-ok-vannak-tobbsegben [https://perma.cc/8RC9-EP48] (outlining policies
harming the Roma); Végh, supra note 7 (“Hungarian refugee policy became even more restrictive
in 2020.”); DUNJA MIJATOVI , COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., REPORT FOLLOWING
HER VISIT TO HUNGARY FROM 4 TO 8 FEBRUARY 2019 7–13 (2019) (describing in detail the lack
of protection, forcible removal, detention, and other mistreatment of refugees in Hungary).
143. See M.C. v. Romania, App. No. 12060/12, ¶ 109 (Apr. 12, 2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-161982 [https://perma.cc/S238-GWWC] (holding that states are required “to take
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to illtreatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals”).
144. See Sabali v. Croatia, App. No. 50231/13, ¶¶ 94–95 (Apr. 14, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-207360 [https://perma.cc/M8B7-ZAZY] (finding that “State authorities have
the duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask possible discriminatory motives” and that a State’s
“domestic legal system must demonstrate its capacity to enforce criminal law” against
discriminatory perpetrators). A failure to do so could result in “indifference . . . tantamount to
official acquiescence to . . . hate crimes.” Id. ¶ 95.
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by the state,145 although states may refuse to extend marriage to samesex couples.146 States may not ban consensual homosexual sex.147 The
Court has also generally held that states may not discriminate against
individuals based on sexual orientation absent a weighty, legitimate
justification,148 as sexual orientation is a protected status under Article
14 of the Convention.149 Prejudicial bias against an individual’s sexual
orientation is per se invalid.150
Hungary has violated several of its obligations under the
Convention previously,151 and several of its new anti-LGBTQ+

145. See Vallianatos v. Greece, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 147 (holding that Greece had not
offered “convincing and weighty reasons” that would justify discriminatory exclusion of same-sex
couples from being able to partner in civil-unions).
146. See Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 399 (“Article 12 expressly
provides for regulation of marriage by national law . . . . Article 12 cannot be construed as
imposing an obligation on the Contracting States to grant access to marriage to same-sex
couples . . . .”).
147. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981) (holding that
statutes criminalizing consensual same-sex conduct amounted to an “unjustified interference with
[Mr. Dudgeon’s] right to respect for his private life” and therefore constituted a violation of
Article 8 under the Convention).
148. See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 142, 147 (reaffirming that “differences based
on sex . . . [and] sexual orientation require ‘particularly convincing and weighty reasons’ by way
of justification” and holding that Greece had “not offered convincing and weighty reasons” to
justify its discrimination).
149. See A.M. v. Russia, App. No. 47220/19, ¶ 73 (Nov. 22, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-210878 [https://perma.cc/36ZD-98ZH] (finding “that the prohibition of discrimination
under Article 14 . . . covers questions related to gender identity”); Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v.
Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 327 (holding that a difference in treatment based on an
applicant’s sexual orientation was “undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention”); see
also Fretté v. France, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 345, 364 (finding Article 14 applicable because an
applicant for adoption was denied service based solely on his sexual orientation).
150. Beizaras v. Lithuania, App. No. 41288/15, ¶ 125 (May 14, 2020), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-200344 [https://perma.cc/DE86-VZ58] (holding that “attitudes or
stereotypes prevailing over a certain period of time among the majority of members of society
may not serve as justifiable grounds for discriminating against persons solely on the basis of their
sexual orientation, or for limiting the right to the protection of private life”).
151. See Rana v. Hungary, App. No. 40888/17, ¶ 42 (July 16, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-203563 [https://perma.cc/9UYZ-X9V] (“[T]he Court considers that by not giving the
applicant access to the legal gender recognition procedure a fair balance has not been struck
between the public interest and the applicant’s right to respect for his private life. There has
therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.”); Shahzad v. Hungary, App. No. 12625/
17, ¶ 68 (Oct. 8, 2021), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-210853 [https://perma.cc/CX55-T8
CA] (determining that Hungary “violat[ed] . . . Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention”);
see also, e.g., Hungary: European Court Declares Authorities Broke EU Law by Detaining
Asylum-Seekers in Transit Zone, AMNESTY INT’L (May 14, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2020/05/hungary-european-court-declares-authorities-broke-eu-law-by-detaining-
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measures152 likely similarly violate it. For example, May 2020 saw
legislation banning transgender individuals from changing their gender
on official documents.153 The ECHR has long held similar legislation to
be a violation of the Convention’s Article 8.154 In December 2020, a
constitutional amendment redefined family as between a man and
woman, effectively banning same-sex couples from adopting
children,155 a measure that may run afoul of ECHR jurisprudence
mandating that adoptions be administered in a nondiscriminatory
manner.156
More recently, in June 2021, Hungary’s parliament passed
legislation that restricted “showing or ‘popularizing’ homosexuality
and content that promotes a gender that diverges from the one

asylum-seekers-in-transit-zone [https://perma.cc/Y44M-Y6P5] (describing Hungary’s detention
of asylum seekers as breaching its human rights obligations under EU law).
152. As part of its slate of constitutional rewriting in 2011, the Hungarian parliament outlawed
same-sex marriage beginning in 2012. Stephen Gray, New Hungarian Constitution Comes into
Effect with Same-Sex Marriage Ban, PINK NEWS (Jan. 3, 2012), https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/
01/03/new-hungarian-constitution-comes-into-effect-with-same-sex-marriage-ban [https://perma.
cc/UJ3Q-8CRN]. In 2018, it banned the teaching of gender studies in universities and removed
accreditation for gender studies Master and PhD programs. Lauren Kent & Samantha
Tapfumaneyi, Hungary’s PM Bans Gender Study at Colleges Saying ‘People Are Born Either Male
or Female,’ CNN (Oct. 19, 2018, 9:22 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/19/europe/hungarybans-gender-study-at-colleges-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/9UPE-WVQY]. In November
2020, Parliament abolished Hungary’s Equal Treatment Authority, the country’s “most important
nondiscrimination agency covering LGBTQ rights.” Beauchamp, How Hatred of Gay People,
supra note 4.
153. Hungary Outlaws Changing Birth Gender on Documents, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52727615 [https://perma.cc/8Y8V-S5HT].
154. See Grant v. United Kingdom, 2006-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 13 (holding that denying a trans
woman “legal recognition of her change of gender” was in violation of Article 8); Goodwin v.
United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 32 (holding that the government’s mistreatment of a
trans woman constituted a “failure to respect her right to private life in breach of Article 8”).
155. Hungary Amends Constitution To Redefine Family, Effectively Banning Gay Adoption,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/hungary-ame
nds-constitution-redefine-family-effectively-banning-gay-adoption-n1251251 [https://perma.cc/
8KTX-5N3T].
156. See X v. Austria, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 50 (holding that although an adoption right was
not guaranteed by Article 8, if a state chooses to extend a right of adoption to individuals, it must
do so non-discriminatorily, in conformity with Article 14 of the Convention); see also E.B. v.
France, App. No. 43546/02, ¶ 49 (Jan. 22, 2008), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84571
[https://perma.cc/NA7K-Z5LM] (holding that because French law allows single people to adopt
children, discrimination against a single, LGBTQ+ person looking to adopt still “undoubtedly
fall[s] within the ambit of Article 8”).
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assigned at birth”157 and also prohibited the teaching of LGBTQ+
issues in schools.158 This legislation is a clear repudiation of Bayev and
Others v. Russia,159 in which the ECHR held that a law banning any
exposure of LGBTQ+ materials to minors violated Article 14 and
Article 10.160 Although the ECHR has not issued a decision on the
Hungarian law, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has found
it likely violates several international human rights standards,
including Articles 8 and 2 of the Convention.161 The report inspired the
EU Commission to launch infringement proceedings against Hungary
because of the legislation in July 2021;162 Prime Minister Orbán
responded by announcing a referendum on the legislation, saying,
“[W]e cannot cede ground in this issue.”163
Sustained attacks against LGBTQ+ persons, among others, in
Hungary display an open disdain for, and consistent violation of, the
values in Article 2 TEU. Orbán’s Hungary has repeatedly targeted
minority groups for persecution in violation of its treaty obligations.

157. Benjamin Novak, Hungary Adopts Child Sex Abuse Law That Also Targets L.G.B.T.
Community, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/europe/
hungary-child-sex-lgbtq.html [https://perma.cc/PM2D-2VHM].
158. Esme Nicholson, Hungary Bans LGBTQ Content from Schools, but Some Teachers Say
They Will Defy It, NPR (July 9, 2021, 6:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/09/1014744317/antilgbtq-law-in-hungary-will-hurt-the-people-it-claims-to-protect-critics-say [https://perma.cc/3ZD
N-6RRW].
159. Bayev v. Russia, App. No. 67667/09 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-174422 [https://perma.cc/G7Q4-TL24].
160. Id. ¶¶ 86–92. The Court found that the legislation was “an example of . . . predisposed
bias” against LGBTQ+ individuals, especially as it tried to liken homosexuality and pedophilia.
Id. ¶ 69. It also highlighted that the law would ultimately likely be “counterproductive” in
achieving its desired aims. Id. ¶ 83.
161. EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L. (VENICE COMM’N), COUNCIL OF EUR.,
HUNGARY: ON THE COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS OF
ACT LXXIX AMENDING CERTAIN ACTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN 23–24 (2021).
162. European Commission Press Release IP/21/3668, EU Founding Values: Commission
Starts Legal Action Against Hungary and Poland for Violations of Fundamental Rights of
LGBTIQ People (July 15, 2021) [hereinafter Commission Press Release].
163. Gergely Szakacs & Anita Komuves, Orban Referendum Plan Raises Stakes in Hungary’s
LGBT Row with EU, REUTERS (July 21, 2021, 8:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/
hungarys-pm-call-referendum-child-protection-issues-2021-07-21 [https://perma.cc/EKE6-RWW
V]. The referendum was ultimately declared invalid and the measure defeated when less than 50
percent of eligible voters answered the question in Hungary’s April 2022 elections. Briar Stewart,
Many Hungarians Spoil Ballots To Invalidate Referendum on LGBTQ Content in Society, CBC
(Apr. 4, 2022, 12:36 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hungary-referendum-lgbtq-1.6407448
[https://perma.cc/QF6L-DLPZ].
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The EU and the Council have said as much in reports,164 infringement
proceedings,165 and resolutions.166 Hungary has not changed course. In
fact, Fidesz’s success in utilizing antiminority messages during
elections, the exponential passage of anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in the
last two years, and Fidesz’s strategy of reshaping Hungary into an
illiberal “democracy” suggest that Hungary will remain in breach of
those values going forward.
C. The Intersection of Poland and Hungary: Is ‘Unanimity’
Possible?
Despite clear evidence that Hungary has materially breached its
obligations under the EU Treaties, it is unlikely that Poland, a fellow
autocracy, would join any attempt at expelling Hungary. This might
seem to defeat Article 60 VCLT’s requirement of unanimity. However,
using a textual analysis, this Note offers EU members a potential
solution: expelling them both.167
At first reading, Article 60 paragraph 2(a) VCLT seems to require
the consent of all Member States to terminate Hungary’s membership.
“[T]he other parties by unanimous agreement” are entitled to
terminate a treaty as between themselves and a materially breaching

164. See MIJATOVI , supra note 142, at 13 (“The Commissioner urges the Hungarian
government to repeal the decreed ‘crisis situation’ and review the legislation applicable under
regular circumstances to bring it into line with Hungary’s human rights obligations.”).
165. Commission Press Release, supra note 162.
166. Resolution on Breaches of EU Law and of the Rights of LGBTIQ Citizens in Hungary
as a Result of the Adopted Legal Changes in the Hungarian Parliament, EUR. PARL. DOC. RSP
2780 (2021).
167. While seemingly extreme, it should be noted that the expulsion of two autocratic states
from the EU is no more radical than other alternatives to the Hungary-Poland problem offered
by other commentators. For example, the inclusion of Article 50 TEU could legally allow a “mass
exit” by like-minded Member States from the EU, leaving only Hungary and Poland in what
might be termed “EU 1.0.” See Athanassiou, supra note 27, at 23, 26 (discussing the concern that
Article 50 does not “cater for a mass exit” even though, “as currently drafted, the exit clause does
not preclude multiple withdrawals”). The then-freed, now-former Member States could then
renegotiate and rejoin an “EU 2.0” without Hungary and Poland included. Indeed, commentators
have already begun advocating for such an attempt. See Tom Theuns, The Need for an EU
Expulsion Mechanism: Democratic Backsliding and the Failure of Article 7, RES PUBLICA, Jan.
13, 2022, at 17, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11158-021-09537-w.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZD4U-NBA5] (advocating for “refounding a new European Union with stronger
democratic and rule of law protections and without recalcitrant members of the current EU” via
the collective withdrawal of democratic members, leaving autocratic states “with a useless husk
of the former EU”).
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state, reads Article 60 paragraph 2(a).168 This alone would be a
Herculean task for an organization that only mustered the requisite
two-thirds to begin Article 7 TEU proceedings against Hungary in
September 2018—eight years after the Fidesz government began
dismantling the country’s democracy.169
Adding Poland back into the political mix would further frustrate
any chance to expel Hungary as Poland is unlikely to consent to expel
Hungary. Poland operates as an emerging sister autocracy in the EU.170
After seeing Fidesz’s success in subverting Hungarian democracy, the
Polish Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, or “PiS”)
quickly copied the “map drawn by Orbán” when it came to power in
2015.171 When Poland’s increasingly authoritarian measures came
under EU criticism, Orbán was quick to defend the country. He
declared it would be “pointless” for the EU to start Article 7 TEU
proceedings against Poland because Hungary would defeat the
required unanimity.172 Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has
168. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60(2)(a) (emphasis added).
169. See Parliament Press Release, supra note 14 (announcing that the European Parliament
in September 2018 approved a proposal for the Council of the EU to determine “whether
Hungary is at risk of breaching the EU’s founding values”).
170. See Anna Wójcik, Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2022: Poland, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/nations-transit/2022 [https://perma.cc/6H5X-5W6T]
(observing that PiS has continued to “further weaken Poland’s democratic institutions” and that
while “national governance remains democratic . . . ruling parties have changed the system to
their advantage [by] capturing and instrumentalizing key institutions”). PiS’s most egregious
violations of Article 2 TEU’s principles continue to be its weakening of the judiciary’s
independence and its manipulation of the captured Polish Constitutional Tribunal to challenge
the supremacy of EU law. See id. (giving Poland its lowest score, 3.25 out of 7.00, in the category
of Judicial Framework and Independence, and noting that “governing politicians [have]
continued to instrumentalize the politically captured Constitutional Tribunal,” which has
continually “escalated conflicts over the rule of law with the European Union”).
171. Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 3, at 553; see also Allyson K. Duncan & John
Macy, The Collapse of Judicial Independence in Poland: A Cautionary Tale, JUDICATURE, Fall/
Winter 2020–21, at 44–45 (quoting Orbán as saying that “the Inquisition offensive against Poland
can never succeed because Hungary will use all legal options in the EU to show solidarity with
the Poles”).
172. Marton Dunai, PM Orban: Hungary Will Block Any Punitive EU Action on Poland,
REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2017, 2:32 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-eu-hungary-Orb
án/pm-Orbán-hungary-will-block-any-punitive-eu-action-on-poland-idUSKBN1EG0NF [https://
perma.cc/EK43-5BLD]. Recent examples continue to demonstrate Orbán’s protective nature
over Poland. In September 2021, Orbán said that the EU was “abusing its power” for attempting
to get Poland to comply with an CJEU order using daily fines. ‘Scandalous and Arrogant’:
Hungary Slams EU over Poland Fines Move, EURONEWS (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.euronews.
com/2021/09/09/scandalous-and-arrogant-hungary-slams-eu-over-poland-fines-move [https://per
ma.cc/V98Y-5DMD].
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reciprocated Orbán’s support.173 This cordial relationship is mutually
beneficial. Having an autocratic ally within the EU defeats any chance
of sanctions, like Article 7 TEU, that require unanimity to work.174
Indeed, PiS-led Poland probably has a strong incentive to vote against
Hungary’s expulsion as it would essentially be expelling its own
insurance policy.175 And because Article 60 VCLT requires the
unanimous consent of “the other parties,” meaning the nonbreaching
parties, Poland’s refusal to expel Hungary would leave that element of
paragraph 2(a) unsatisfied.176
A textual analysis of paragraph 2(a), however, suggests this need
not be the end of the discussion. As a materially breaching state itself,
there is nothing to suggest that Poland could not be expelled alongside
Hungary. Paragraph 2(a) reads: “A material breach of a multilateral
treaty by one of the parties entitles . . . the other parties by unanimous
agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in
part . . . .”177 There must be “unanimous agreement” amongst the
“other parties”—that is, the nonbreaching treaty members. The phrase

173. Morawiecki’s first international trip was to visit Orbán in Budapest. Soraya Sarhaddi
Nelson, How Poland and Hungary Are Forming a Powerful Tag Team Against Brussels, NPR
(Mar. 12, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/12/587949473/howpoland-and-hungary-are-forming-a-powerful-tag-team-against-brussels [https://perma.cc/ACN2PF7T]. Poland joined Hungary in threatening to block an EU coronavirus budget that included
rule-of-law conditionality. Maïa de La Baume, Hans von der Burchard & David M. Herszenhorn,
Poland Joins Hungary in Threatening To Block EU’s Budget and Coronavirus Recovery Package,
POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:51 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-joins-hungary-in-thre
at-to-block-eus-landmark-budget-and-recovery-package [https://perma.cc/VJ5X-HJ5N]. Additionally,
the pair jointly challenged an EU Parliament order enforcing that conditionality before the
CJEU. Thomas Wahl, CJEU Dismisses Actions against Rule-of-Law Conditionality to Safeguard
the EU Budget, EUCRIM (Feb. 16, 2022), https://eucrim.eu/news/cjeu-dismisses-actions-against-ru
le-of-law-conditionality-to-safeguard-the-eu-budget [https://perma.cc/9BTD-KJ99].
174. Pech & Scheppele, supra note 16, at 12.
175. At the time of this writing, however, the Polish-Hungarian alliance is in flux, and future
Polish cooperation with the EU against a Russia-aligned Hungary may be imaginable. Orbán has
increasingly resisted efforts by the EU to punish the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “infuriat[ing]
his usual allies in Poland, whose right-wing EU-skeptic governing party is a strong supporter of
Ukraine and has long seen Mr. Putin as a threat.” Norman & Walker, supra note 51. With
Hungary continuing to block an EU ban of Russian oil and refusing to allow weapons to be
transported through Hungarian territory to Ukraine, security differences between Hungary and
Poland may deepen fractures between the two autocratic states. See id. (stating that Polish
officials “have stopped meeting Hungarian cabinet ministers, citing irreconcilable differences”).
Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski has gone so far as to say that Poland and
Hungary “can’t continue to cooperate as before.” Id.
176. VCLT, supra note 21, at art. 60(2)(a).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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“other parties” is in turn contrasted with the preceding phrase, “one of
the parties,” which refers to a materially breaching treaty member.
Thus, paragraph 2 sets up a dichotomy: the nonbreaching “other
parties” who must be in unanimous agreement to expel “one of the
parties” in material breach. The state in material breach is excluded
from being considered one of the “other parties” and therefore its
consent to expulsion is not required.178
A textual interpretation of the phrase “one of the parties” shows
that it should be construed as a floor, not a ceiling, on the number of
treaty members that could be expelled. Consider if you were to say,
“One person at the party does not like to drink.” This could be
interpreted as setting a ceiling: one and only one person at the party
does not like to drink. Under this interpretation, the sentence is making
a numerical statement of fact. That said, the sentence does not make a
logical claim about how others at the party feel about drinking. The
sentence’s meaning is ambiguous. But saying “One of the people at the
party does not like to drink” clearly sets a floor: at least one person at
the party does not like to drink. That statement does not preclude
others at the party not liking to drink. Instead, there simply has to be
at least one who does not. Article 60 VCLT should be read similarly.
By using the phrase “one of the parties,” it allows at least one state, but
possibly more, to be in material breach. And since a materially
breaching state’s consent is not required for its own expulsion, that
state’s objection does not prevent “unanimous agreement.” In this way,
the case could be made that both Poland and Hungary should be
considered “one of the parties” in material breach and that their
agreement (or lack thereof) is not required to satisfy the unanimity
requirement of “the other parties.” Under this reading, the
nonbreaching Member States could invoke Article 60 VCLT against
both.179
178. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
179. This, of course, raises the same questions discussed in this Note about Poland as it does
about Hungary, and Poland would need to similarly breach “ever closer union.” See supra Parts
II–III.A. Whether Poland would satisfy the requirements of a material breach is beyond the scope
of this Note. However, given the similarities between Hungarian and Polish action, there is good
reason to think that Poland may have also materially breached Article 2 TEU. See Kovács &
Scheppele, supra note 99, at 194–98 (generally describing how PiS captured Poland’s judiciary
and ignored rule of law recommendations from the EU). It should also be noted that this
interpretation of Article 60 VCLT’s unanimity requirement could, theoretically, allow for the
expulsion of more than just two materially-breaching Member States. Read this way, the text does
not offer any obvious limiting principle. This Note does not take a position on how far this
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IV. BENEFITS & CONSEQUENCES OF EXPULSION
Part III shows that Hungary, by its Article 2 TEU violations, has
materially breached the EU Treaties’ purpose of “ever closer union.”
Therefore, it is necessary and appropriate to expel Hungary from the
EU. However, expulsion from the EU is unprecedented and would
admittedly be an “extreme remedy.”180 This Part will address four
responses to expulsion: (1) the normative value of expelling autocratic
states; (2) the ability to effect change in Member States; (3) possible
preclusion by EU mechanisms; and (4) the precedential value of EU
expulsion for international organizations generally.
A. The Normative Importance of Expulsion
The first reason that Hungarian expulsion is appropriate is that
the expulsion of autocratic Member States would proclaim the EU’s
commitment to its foundational liberal democratic values. By failing to
expel Hungary, the EU would implicitly signal a tolerance of
Hungary’s authoritarian, illiberal values and risk a loss of its own
legitimacy on the world stage.
The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen the
proliferation of autocratic regimes not just in the EU but across the
world.181 Autocratic leaders have risen to power and eroded,
sometimes entirely, democratic institutions in states across the political
spectrum and in every corner of the globe: Hungary, Poland, Russia,182

interpretation could be taken. Still, given the other stringent requirements of Article 60 VCLT, it
seems unlikely that multi-state expulsions could be invoked easily.
180. Blocher et al., supra note 27, at 132.
181. See generally SARAH REPUCCI & AMY SLIPOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE
WORLD 2022: THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE (2022) (outlining the rise of
authoritarian regimes across the world and documenting the state of autocracy in 2022).
182. See Vladimir Putin Has Shifted from Autocracy to Dictatorship, ECONOMIST (Nov. 13,
2021), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/11/13/vladimir-putin-has-shifted-from-autocracyto-dictatorship [https://perma.cc/X6RD-XWK4] (“The [Russian] regime has moved from being a
consensual autocracy supported by co-option and propaganda to a dictatorship resting on
repression and fear.”).
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Venezuela,183 Brazil,184 the Philippines,185 Myanmar,186 and Turkey,187 to
name a few. But the EU has done little to curb the autocratic
tendencies of its own Member States. Not only have the levers used by
the EU failed to halt or reverse democratic backsliding in Hungary and
Poland, but its failure to activate mechanisms that might work, like
Article 7 TEU, has revealed the internal (often political) disunity
between the EU Member States.188 This is especially problematic
because this disunity centers around what (theoretically) should bind
the Member States together. An erosion of Article 2 TEU’s values with
no response from the EU signals either an impotence or an
unwillingness to protect those values. Either option gives autocracies a
free pass to continue violating inherently important ideals with no
consequence.
Expulsion of autocratic states offers a potential alternative to
regain some of the EU’s lost legitimacy and to display a firm,
actionable commitment to the EU’s values. Expelling the autocracies
from its ranks would send the strongest of signals that the EU views

183. See Zeeshan Aleem, How Venezuela Went from a Rich Democracy to a Dictatorship on
the Brink of Collapse, VOX (Sept. 19, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/161
89742/venezuela-maduro-dictator-chavez-collapse [https://perma.cc/HC3Q-FE45] (stating that President
Nicolás Maduro has “overseen Venezuela’s descent into economic catastrophe, lost swaths of
[Hugo] Chávez’s committed political base, and become one of Latin America’s newest
autocrats”).
184. See Oliver Stuenkel, Brazilian Democracy Is Holding Up – but the Biggest Test Will Come
in 2022, AMS. Q. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazilian-democracyis-holding-up-but-the-biggest-test-will-come-in-2022 [https://perma.cc/QP8E-F3PX] (discussing
“the risk of a return to the dark days of authoritarian rule”).
185. See Ed. Bd., Opinion: The Philippines Slides Toward Autocracy, WASH. POST (June 15,
2020, 3:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-philippines-slides
-toward-autocracy/2020/06/15/a668d424-af25-11ea-8758-bfd1d045525a_story.html [https://perma
.cc/2B96-99VE] (“Acting under the cover of the covid-19 pandemic, Mr. Duterte is seeking to
obliterate checks on his power, whether from the media, Congress or courts.”).
186. See Hannah Beech, Myanmar Coup Puts the Seal on Autocracy’s Rise in Southeast Asia,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/12/world/asia/myanmar-coupautocracy-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/HYR6-L7MH] (“The coup in Myanmar feels like a
relic of a Southeast Asian past, when men in uniform roamed a vast dictators’ playground.”).
187. See The New Depths of Erdogan’s Autocracy, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2019), https://www.
economist.com/leaders/2019/05/09/the-new-depths-of-erdogans-autocracy [https://perma.cc/KW
57-Y3KN] (describing Erdogan’s meddling in Turkey’s free and fair elections as the “latest
downward lurch in Turkey’s descent into Central Asian-style dictatorship”).
188. For example, the European People’s Party seemed invested in stalling any attack on
Hungary because of Hungary’s membership in (and consistent votes for) the EPP. Pech &
Scheppele, supra note 16, at 7, 28.
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Article 2 TEU’s values as normatively vital and legally actionable in
the event of their violation.189
B. Expulsion Would Better Effect Change Than Retaining
Hungary
Some might argue that retaining autocratic Member States would
allow the EU to better effect democratic change. However, the actual
failure of current mechanisms and the likely failure of monetary
mechanisms to reverse democratic backsliding suggests that the EU
will have greater leverage to effect positive change via expulsion.
Consider first the failures of the current regime to stop the
emergence and entrenchment of autocracy in Hungary and Poland.
Fidesz began its modern reign in Hungary in 2010190 and PiS in 2015.191
Numerous infringement proceedings instituted under Article 258 and
Article 259 TEU have failed to reverse autocratic institutions or
practices measurably in either country.192 In many cases, despite EU
legal success against these states, victory has been at best “Pyrrhic.”193
Hungary’s attack on the Central European University (“CEU”)
provides an illustration. Legislation passed in 2017, widely recognized
as targeting the CEU, was challenged by the EU under an infringement
proceeding.194 The EU’s challenge was successful,195 but by the time the

189. Melissa Gutierrez made a similar argument in the context of the Greek debt crisis and
the EMU, an institution that also does not have an expulsion provision. Gutierrez, supra note 27,
at 447–48. There, she argued that an expulsion provision would “act as a deterrent to the sort of
overspending and misreporting that launched Greece into the throws [sic] of bankruptcy.” Id.
Indeed, she argues, an expulsion “provision would bolster the enforcement arm of the EMU.” Id.
at 448.
190. See generally Fanny Facsar, Center-right Fidesz Party Sweeps to Victory in Hungary, CNN
(Apr. 26, 2010, 6:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/26/hungary.election.res
ults/index.html [https://perma.cc/D8PQ-B43Y] (discussing Fidesz’s electoral win of 263 out of 386
seats in Hungary’s parliament).
191. See Associated Press in Warsaw, Rightwing Law and Justice Party Wins Overall Majority
in Polish Election, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
15/oct/27/poland-law-justice-party-wins-235-seats-can-govern-alone [https://perma.cc/58UX-CY
N8].
192. See, e.g., supra note 162 and accompanying text; infra note 195 and accompanying text.
193. Pech & Scheppele, supra note 16, at 20.
194. Case C-66/18, Eur. Comm’n v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 (Oct. 6, 2020).
195. Id. ¶ 242–43.
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decision came down—three years after the law was enacted—the CEU
had already moved its operations to Vienna.196
In fact, even as the EU’s responses to Hungary and Poland have
increased in recent years, the autocratic institutions in those states have
only expanded, entrenched, and more openly opposed the EU. Neither
Hungary nor Poland has offered any signs of a course correction back
from autocratic to democratic institutions.197 Hungary has also showed
no apparent interest in coming into conformity with EU law. The
recent passage of anti-LGBTQ+ laws in the country, and Orbán’s open
defiance of EU punishment, demonstrates a continued flouting of EU
law and values.198 This shows that internal EU mechanisms have failed
to rein in or reverse the democratic backsliding of two of its Member
States.
Monetary mechanisms have similarly shown little success at
inducing a reversion to democratic norms. The EU has recently
attempted to raise pressure on Hungary and Poland by issuing them
increasingly heavy fines for noncompliance with EU law,199 a stratagem
ruled constitutional by the CJEU in 2022.200 These are effectively
internal economic sanctions by the EU on its own Member States. But
studies question the effectiveness of sanctions.201 Though the

196. Callan Quinn, E Commission Rules Lex CEU Breaches Int’l Law, PIE NEWS (Oct. 14,
2020), https://thepienews.com/news/european-commission-lex-ceu-hungary [https://perma.cc/3A
RD-3T2D].
197. For example, as mentioned earlier, consolidation of media by the Hungarian government
has only increased with the government now controlling over 90 percent of all national media
outlets. Dragomir, supra note 114. In fact, it was this autocratic election system that ensured
Orbán won reelection handily in 2022 during Hungary’s presidential election. Scheppele, In
Hungary, Orban Wins Again, supra note 9.
198. Szakacs & Komuves, supra note 163.
199. Martin Goillandeau & Ivana Kottasová, EU’s Top Court Fines Poland 1 Million Euros
per Day over Judiciary Spat, CNN (Oct. 27, 2021, 1:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/27/eur
ope/poland-eu-fine-supreme-court-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/VAU4-6TR6].
200. See Raf Casert, EU Can Withhold Funds from Hungary, Poland, Top Court Rules, AP
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/europe-poland-hungary-european-union-46b53
e8a6e8fcae054c07c252c274117 [https://perma.cc/LJ4J-96JC] (“[T]he European Union’s highest
court said . . . the 27-nation bloc can suspend support payments to member states if they breach
rule of law principles.”).
201. Consensus on the effectiveness of economic sanctions is, at best, mixed, and sanctions
can have other, non-economic negative externalities. See Do Economic Sanctions Actually
Work?, WEEK (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.theweek.co.uk/88349/fact-check-do-economicsanctions-actually-work [https://perma.cc/F5YK-RUMF] (“In one of the most comprehensive
studies on sanctions to date, academics examined more than 170 case studies spanning a century
of economic measures and concluded that sanctions were partially successful only 34% of the
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economies of Hungary and Poland might suffer, ultimately everyday
Hungarians and Poles would be the most heavily hurt, not the ruling
members of Fidesz or PiS.202 It is highly unlikely that economic
sanctions of any degree would pressure an entrenched political party
to suddenly vacate all its positions of power,203 nor is it clear how such
a remedy would work in practice. Moreover, there are also concerns
that a deprivation of EU funds will have precisely the opposite effect;
rather than pressuring Fidesz into compliance with EU values, it will
only deepen Fidesz’s anti-EU messaging in Hungary, further dividing
the bloc.204
Additionally, Hungary’s systemic violations of its obligations seem
to necessitate the use of ‘systemic remedies,’ or put another way,
regime change. But the EU has no police power or standing army to
enforce the CJEU’s judgements, and the very mechanisms that might
be used to enforce remedies—like Article 7 TEU or fines—have
proven ineffective.
time.”); Mark Malloch Brown & Harry Gibson, Do Sanctions Work?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 22, 2014,
3:45 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/do-sanctions-work-293957 [https://perma.cc/2239-T54E]
(“[The sanctions] success rate is heavily influenced by the type of policy change pursued. Where
it is modest—the release of a political prisoner, for example—the rate jumps up to half of cases.
Regime change or efforts to disrupt a military adventure fare less well.”); see also Use and Effect
of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 106th Cong. 102 (1999) (statement of Richard N. Haass, Dir., Foreign Pol’y Stud.,
Brookings Inst.) (noting that “U.S. sanctions may have made it easier for the Castro regime to
maintain control over the Cuban economy and society” and that “[o]ver time, economic sanctions
tend to lose their bite”).
202. See generally The Ezra Klein Show, Sanctions Against Russia Are a Form of War. It’s
Time We Recognize That., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/01/
opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-nicholas-mulder.html [https://perma.cc/UC9N-KUGN] (interviewing
historian Nicholas Mulder and noting that sanctions disproportionally hurt ordinary people,
rather than national elites, because of the latter’s access to other avenues of obtaining sanctioned
goods or capital).
203. This is not to suggest that targeted sanctions may never work to force ruling elites or
entrenched parties to concede something for the removal of sanctions. But there is sparse
evidence that sanctions have ever had enough impact to coerce ruling elites to negotiate
themselves out of power. For example, while sanctions may have operated as a “tangible
economic incentive to negotiate” on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran, despite their breadth and length, they were only ever able to
effect changes to Iran’s specific nuclear program, not the composition of Iran’s ruling elite. See
generally Mirko Draca, Jason Garred, Leanne Stickland & Nele Warrinnier, On Target? Sanctions
and the Economic Interests of Elite Policymakers in Iran, ECON. J., July 29, 2022 (discussing the
effectiveness and effect of economic sanctions on Iran).
204. See Inotai, supra note 12 (“It is likely, therefore, that the EU’s rule-of-law punishment
will strengthen Orban’s anti-EU course, especially after the massive political backing the prime
minister feels he was given by the electorate at Sunday’s election.”).
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This leaves us with treaty termination. In the face of mechanisms
that have either failed to be used or have failed in use, the last legal
self-help remedy against a materially breaching state by its
nonbreaching treaty partners is the termination of treaty relations.
Expulsion would empower the EU to deal with Hungary afresh. While
economic sanctions might not prove effective, the EU could require
compliance with certain standards when entering into agreements with
a newly independent Hungary.205 Moreover, if Hungary were to
eventually reapply for membership, the EU’s leverage to demand the
reintroduction of democratic institutions, the divestment of
government-owned media, and the removal of checks against political
interference in the judiciary would be at its zenith. The EU has been
largely successful in promoting the advancement of democracy, the
rule of law, judicial independence, and respect for fundamental rights
in prospective Member States206 because it requires acceding Member
States to meet high standards in those areas before joining.207 For
example, the EU could require reaffirmation of Hungary’s
commitment to Article 2 TEU and the Copenhagen criteria and
introduce ‘check-in’ mechanisms that would allow for the suspension
of the accession process if there were signs of democratic backsliding.208
It should be noted that even if the EU does not expel Hungary,
the shadow of expulsion as a viable remedy might prove as effective at
inducing compliance as expulsion itself. The IMF’s general counsel
observed that the threat of expulsion from the IMF was enough to
corral breaching states, like Argentina, back into compliance.209 Here
too, the mere threat of expulsion if declared viable could discipline
states into correcting their breaches.

205. And indeed, might have to, based on the substantive requirements that Article 3(5) and
21 TEU impose upon EU international relations. See Wessel & Larik, supra note 88, at 11.
206. Id. at 489 (“Before a state can join the EU, it needs to go through the accession procedure
to align itself with the EU’s acquis and values. In that sense, its enlargement policy has been one
of the EU’s most effective forms of external action causing wide-ranging reforms in outside
countries.”).
207. See id. at 474–78 (describing EU accession policy).
208. See, e.g., id. at 476–78 (discussing that the “European Commission set up a Cooperation
and Verification Mechanism (CVM)” to assess Bulgaria and Romania’s progress on “judicial
reform, corruption and [. . .] organised crime”).
209. Blocher et al., supra note 27, at 134 & n.28.
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C. The Possible Preclusion of CIL by the EU Treaties

Some academics argue that the silence of the EU Treaties on
expulsion and the presence of an express discipling mechanism, Article
7 TEU, preclude expulsion as a remedy against breaching Member
States. Not so. The absence of an expulsion provision in the EU
Treaties and the narrow scope of their disciplining mechanisms support
the proposition that Member States retain their traditional CIL power
of expulsion.
As mentioned in Part I, the EU Treaties do not contain an express
expulsion provision, and so the question becomes how to interpret
their silence. Either the EU Treaties offer a “complete set of rules,”210
thus prohibiting any reference to underlying CIL, or they operate only
as an additional layer of international law and do allow recourse “to
the law of treaties [i.e., the VCLT and the codified CIL contained
therein] to cover any possible lacunae.”211 To be sure, states may
contract around their traditionally sovereign CIL rights, like expulsion,
by entering treaties that preclude those rights as between themselves.212
Here, the EU Member States, per a provision in the Treaties, could
abrogate the CIL right of expulsion by including an article explicitly
excluding it. But, as mentioned, there is no such article.213 Thus, the EU
Member States have not contracted around (or out of) their right of
expulsion, and so should be read to retain it.
This approach also conforms most faithfully to the long-held
“Lotus principle,” which favors the sovereignty and freedom of the
state in the absence of express obligations.214 Because the “rules of law
binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will,”
international courts disfavor presumptions restricting state

210. Jed Odermatt, Brexit and International Law: Disentangling Legal Orders, 31 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. RECENT DEVS. 1051, 1065 (2017) (italics omitted).
211. Gino Naldi & Konstantinos Magliveras, The Right To Revoke Withdrawal Notices from
International Organizations: The Case of Brexit and the European Union, 28 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
& COMPAR. L. 30, 50 (2021).
212. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Treaty law and CIL are theoretically nonhierarchical sources of law, each of which operates independently on international actors;
however, “it is generally accepted that international agreements constitute the primary source of
international law.” DELANO VERWEY, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TREATIES 89 (2004).
213. Blocher et al., supra note 27.
214. An Hertogen, Letting Lotus Bloom, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901, 902 (2015).
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independence.215 Phrased another way, “that [which] is not prohibited
is consequently allowed” under international law.216 This presumption
would suggest that Member States have retained their sovereign right
of treaty termination. And indeed, the CJEU itself seemed to follow
this principle in its Wightman decision: rather than displacing the
traditional CIL right to unilaterally revoke a withdrawal wholesale,217
the Court read that right into Article 50 TEU, preserving a greater
swath of state sovereignty than it necessarily had to.218
A related argument against expulsion is that the existence of a
specific disciplinary mechanism in the TEU, Article 7 TEU, precludes
the possibility of a treaty termination right under CIL. This argument
posits that because Article 7 TEU offers a mechanism for the
suspension of certain rights of a breaching Member State, including
voting rights in EU organs, the Treaties do preempt a retained
expulsion right. This criticism would be well founded but for two
problems. First, while Article 7 TEU might preempt Article 60 VCLT’s
power to suspend the application of treaties, Article 7 TEU does
nothing to textually reach Article 60 VCLT’s power to terminate.219
The housing of two independent powers—the right to suspend a treaty
and the right to terminate a treaty—in the same article does not mean
that preemption of one power in the article mandates the preemption
of the entirely distinct power.
Second, the text of Article 7 TEU allows only for the suspension
of “certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties.”220
One might theorize that this also preempts Article 60 VCLT’s
termination power because it could affect a de facto termination via a
215. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
216. Naldi & Magliveras, supra note 211, at 47.
217. Jake Rylatt, The Irrevocability of an Article 50 Notification: Lex Specialis and the
Irrelevance of the Purported Customary Right To Unilaterally Revoke, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (July
27, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/27/jake-rylatt-the-irrevocability-of-an-article50-notification-lex-specialis-and-the-irrelevance-of-the-purported-customary-right-to-unilateral
ly-revoke [https://perma.cc/M22V-9F2P] (noting that the CJEU could have read Article 50 to
“displace the customary regime via the principle of lex specialis derogat lex generali”).
218. See Naldi & Magliveras, supra note 211, at 52. The authors note that the Court took “a
traditional, voluntarist approach” to the question of whether withdrawal was a unilateral
sovereign right, emphasizing that “Member States remain sovereign states with the autonomous
right to terminate membership.” Id.
219. Article 60 VCLT gives two related, but independent, powers to injured states: they may
terminate or suspend the operation of a bilateral or multilateral treaty. VCLT, supra note 21, at
art. 60(1)–(2).
220. TEU, supra note 19, at art. 7(3) (emphasis added).
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total suspension of a breaching Member States’ rights. The wording of
the article suggests otherwise. Article 7 TEU allows for the suspension
of “certain” rights, implying the existence of other, unsuspended rights.
Thus, a de facto expulsion cannot be affected. Moreover, Article 7
TEU is clear that “[t]he obligations of the Member State . . . shall in
any case continue to be binding on that State.”221 This foresees a state
still bound to the treaty regime: the breaching State, though it loses
“certain” rights, retains the obligations of the treaty relationship.
D. The precedential value of termination powers in IOs
Finally, there may be concerns that a retained expulsion right
would reduce states’ initial incentives to form international
organizations. Under this theory, states might be hesitant to form
international organizations or join multilateral treaties silent on
expulsion out of fear that they themselves may be one day expelled. It
may be that a state is as interested in the stability, predictability, and
permanence a treaty brings as its substance—characteristics
threatened if members retain their rights to expel fellow treaty
members. Why grant painful concessions to and engage in protracted
negotiations with other states, if you’re liable to be expelled whenever
your fellow members decide they no longer want you in the club?
These fears are accompanied by concerns that member states of
international organizations (“IOs”) could leverage this retained
expulsion power to force coercive bargains on their treaty partners, to
conditionalize continued membership in the IO.222 There are several
responses to these concerns.
First, Article 60 VCLT’s inherent hurdles make it difficult to
invoke. As mentioned, the article was designed to strike the right
balance between the notion of pacta sunt servanda and international
law’s reliance on self-help mechanisms. It did so via a number of
stringent structural requirements, most notably the unanimity
requirement in Article 60(2)(a)223 and its internal proportionality

221. Id.
222. Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 379, 382 (2010).
223. See supra Part III.B. Other mechanisms, not discussed here, include the arbitration
mechanisms in Article 65 VCLT, see VCLT Article 65, and the principle of proportionality (either
prebuilt into or layered on top of the application of Article 60 VCLT). For further discussion of
proportionality, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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requirement.224 The article’s high demands no doubt inform why there
is such little state practice using it.225 The retention of a termination
right would and could do nothing to alter the exacting thresholds laid
out by Article 60 VCLT.
State practice in IOs that have explicit expulsion powers affirm
that expulsion is rarely used. The League of Nations,226 the United
Nations,227 and the IMF228 all have (had) explicit expulsion provisions
in their charters. However, between these three institutions there are
only two recorded state expulsions: in 1939, the League of Nations
expelled the Soviet Union in response to its invasion of Finland,229 and
in 1954, Czechoslovakia was expelled from the IMF for failure to
provide required data.230 Rarely will an IO resort to utilizing its
enumerated expulsion powers, and often it will only do so after all
other avenues have been exhausted.231 Combined with the high hurdles
inherent to Article 60 VCLT, this historical state practice suggests that
it is unlikely member states would be able to muster the political and
legal will to use their termination powers to force coercive bargains.
Even if Article 60 VCLT were interpreted to allow for the expulsion of
multiple members, such an effort would still likely require the
consensus of a large number of member states—an effort the cost of
which would probably only be warranted in extraordinary
circumstances.
Second, there are reasons to suspect that states might be more
incentivized to join international organizations when their power of
treaty termination is preserved. There is high membership in IOs with
explicit expulsion powers, which suggests expulsion does not dissuade
members from joining IOs. The United Nations, at current count, has

224. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
225. Dörr & Schmalenbach, supra note 62, at 1048 (“There is no significant States practice
either before or after Art 60 entered into force.”).
226. League of Nations Covenant art. 16.
227. U.N. Charter art. 6.
228. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 26, § 2, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
229. Collin Makamson, ‘The League Is Dead. Long Live the United Nations.,’ NAT’L WWII
MUSEUM (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/league-of-nations
[https://perma.cc/64QA-STTD].
230. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42019, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 10–11 (2018).
231. Blagoev, supra note 25, at 192; Blocher et al., supra note 27, at 133–34.
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193 members;232 the IMF, 190.233 The inclusion of an expulsion
provision first in the League of Nations and then in the UN similarly
suggests support across time for an expulsion provision. What is clear
is that the preservation of a right of treaty termination offers hesitant
states greater protections against their potentially breaching treaty
partners. There are no enforcement mechanisms in international law;
states rely on self-help mechanisms to ensure their partners’ treaty
compliance and to protect themselves against breaching states. The
right to terminate treaty relations with materially breaching states is an
indispensable stick in this bundle of international sanctioning rights.
And to shackle a performing state to a breaching partner with no
escape except by its own withdrawal not only severely violates the
notion of consent, but is also manifestly unjust to the performing state.
States might be more willing to risk entering into treaty relations with
potentially breaching partners if they knew that treaties silent on
termination preserved their right of termination, rather than
preempting it.
CONCLUSION
The rise of Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland has forced the EU
into nothing less than an existential crisis. Two of its Member States
blatantly violate and reject its founding values. In Hungary alone,
democracy has eroded, the courts have been captured, opposition
media have been silenced, and vulnerable minority groups systemically
degraded and attacked. As it stands, the EU is paralyzed, without the
legal framework to expel a Member State or the will to see it done. This
Note can only provide one of these. Ultimately, it remains up to the
Member States themselves to say whether they are willing to defend
the values they preach. Divided, the EU might yet stand. But united,
its certain fate is to fall.

232. Growth in United Nations Membership, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/aboutus/growth-in-un-membership [https://perma.cc/QQL6-BHXW].
233. List of Members, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/
memdate.htm [https://perma.cc/3TZ6-M4QE].

